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During the mid-1990s to 2001, South Africa was the victim of numerous terrorist acts carried out 
by the People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD). This paper discusses the problems and 
the procedures and methods used to combat domestic terrorism in constitutional democracies as 
well as the problems encountered by democratic South Africa in responding to PAGAD bearing 
in mind the legal-constitutional and the political constraints that this democracy faces. Using 
PAGAD as a case-study and discussing and analyzing the South African counter-terrorism 
strategies that were used against PAGAD, many interesting features are observed which clearly 
show that, while South Africa exemplified the problems that older constitutional democracies 
face when responding to terrorism, the country also deviated from what is usually expected from 
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Formulating and executing strategies to respond to terrorism are challenges for democratic states.  
Not only should the strategies be efficient, but also not at the cost of human rights, the rule of 
law and the Constitution. 
After South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, the country saw the emergence of the 
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and the Boeremag (Boer Force).  Both groups 
engaged in domestic terrorism. 
To respond to PAGAD, the government employed various strategies that can be categorized into 
intelligence-led policing operations and political strategies.  These strategies will be discussed 
and analyzed in this research paper. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
 
Using PAGAD as a case-study, the question being addressed in this research paper is: “How did 
the South African government respond to PAGAD and was this response at the cost of 
Constitution and the rule of law?”  As an empirical question, it seeks to establish relevant facts 
about South Africa’s response to PAGAD as a vigilante organization that used terrorism to 




This research paper utilizes a qualitative research approach of the theory-confirming Case Study 
Method in which the case is analyzed within the framework of established generalizations. 
 
The main advantage of the Case Study method is that it allows an intensive examination of the 
case.  It provides deep information and makes an important contribution to the establishment of 













shortcomings.  Generalizations cannot be made, selection bias1 exists and inaccurate information 
is sometimes obtained. 
 
In this research paper, both primary and secondary sources of information are used.  The primary 
sources of information include analysis of literature of national legislations on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism and interviews2 with individuals knowledgeable about PAGAD and the 
government’s response to PAGAD.3 
  
While interviews yield detailed and rich information, there are problems that can be expected.  
Not only are interviews time-consuming, they may also not provide the correct information.  The 
interviewee may distort his or her information by misunderstanding the questions through recall 
error and selective perceptions and because he or she wishes to please the interviewer.4  
Additionally, the interviewer may find it difficult in remaining objective and passive or 
administering the questions correctly.  These problems easily bias the respondent’s answers. 
Hence, questions that required feats of memory were avoided.  The respondent’s answers were 
compared and checked with other sources of information to avoid inconsistencies and it was 
ensured that the respondent fully understood the context of the questions being asked. 
 
Secondary sources of information included newspaper articles, books and journals about 
PAGAD and the government’s response to PAGAD. 
 
                                                 
1 The case is chosen based on familiarity and preconceptions and interpretations have already been made. 
 
2 All the interviewees asked to remain anonymous because of the sensitivity of the information they provided. Some 
feared for their lives as they were previously threatened for having provided information about PAGAD. One was 
closely involved with the intelligence service and another one was the lawyer of a jailed PAGAD member. Both 
were very insistent on the confidentiality of the information they provided and on remaining anonymous. The 
government officials who were interviewed also requested anonymity. 
 
3 To make the interviews more effective and interactive, questionnaires were designed and communicated to the 
respondents prior to the interviews.  The focus of the interviews was related to the origin and the activities of 
PAGAD, its organizational structure and the government’s response to the organization.  Telephone calls and 
correspondence by e-mail were also made to several individuals (such as cabinet ministers and African National 
Congress officials) and experts from institutions such as the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the South African 
Police Service (SAPS) who had information that could enhance the quality of the research paper.   
 













Once the data was collected, it was subjected to interpretation and a critical analysis involving 
cross-referencing the findings and comparatively assessing the information through theoretical 
underpinnings, accuracy, bias and assumptions, methodology, validity, consistency, evidence 
and purpose.5  This exercise was undertaken to ensure that relevant, reliable and credibility 
information was collected.  Reliability is synonymous with consistency while credibility is 
associated with validity.    
 
1.3 Definitional Concepts 
 
To enable an effective understanding of key themes within this research paper, this sub-section 
provides the definition of important concepts such as political terrorism,6 counter-terrorism, 
democracy and constitutional democracy.7 
 
1.3.1 Political Terrorism 
 
Terrorism is described as a means to an end, a violent method that is shocking, that causes fear 
and panic and that is used by a variety of actors to change the attitudes and behaviours of 
targeted audiences.8  Political terrorism, a type of terrorism, is described as a method that entails 
the use of coercive intimidation by revolutionary movements, regimes or individuals for political 
motives.9  It is inherently indiscriminate in its effects because no one can be sure that they will 
not be the next victim of terrorism.10   
                                                 
5 F. W. Struwig, and G. B. Stead, Planning, Designing and Reporting Research (South Africa: Maskew Miller 
Longman, 2001), 149 
 
6 This research paper deals specifically with domestic terrorism occurring within constitutional democracies.  
Domestic terrorism refers to terrorism acts that are restricted to the borders of one country, confined to national 
territories and not targets abroad. 
 
7 Arriving at widely accepted definitions of terrorism and democracy is difficult.  Hence, Martha Crenshaw’s 
definition of terrorism will be used and with regards to constitutional democracy, a generic definition of what 
characterizes Western democratic states will be given. 
 
8 M. Crenshaw.  “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts” in Terrorism in Context. Edited by M. 
Crenshaw, (The United States of America: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 3-27. 
 
9 P. Wilkinson, “Concepts of Terror and Terrorism” in Political Terrorism (London: MacMillan Education Ltd, 
1974), 11. There is a wide debate about the definition of political terrorism.  Wilkinson provides a basic definition 













Political terrorism is also unpredictable, arbitrary and it makes use of ruthless and extreme 
methods (these can range from genocide to political murder)11 which shock, intimidate and 
create fear that works to the advantage of the terrorist.12 
 
1.3.1.1 Types of Political Terrorism 
 
Revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, repressive terrorism and organizational 
terrorism are all types of political terrorism.13   
 
1.3.1.1.1 Revolutionary Terrorism 
 
Revolutionary terrorism occurs when movements or factions use terror with the objective of 
bringing about a political revolution and a change of political system.14 
 
1.3.1.1.2 Sub-Revolutionary Terrorism 
 
Sub-revolutionary terrorism15 is carried out for political goals such as coercion of the 
government to change certain policies or laws or to remove or punish certain officials.16  It is 
unpredictable.17  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
10 Combatants, non-combatants, the injured, women and children are all expendable.   
 
11 Ibid.  
 
12 P. Wilkinson, “Force, Violence, Order and the Liberal State” in Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: 
MacMillan Education Ltd, 1986), 54-56. 
 
13 These typologies are well outlined by Paul Wilkinson.  However, they are not exhaustive.  Wilkinson rules out 
criminal terrorism, war terrorism and psychological terrorism as typologies of political terrorism because they do not 
belong to analyses of political terrorism.  Hence, they will not be covered in this chapter. 
 
14 P. Wilkinson, “Concepts of Terror and Terrorism” in Political Terrorism (London: MacMillan Education Ltd, 
1974), 36. 
 
15 Or “agitational” terrorism. 
 
16 Ibid, 38. 
 













1.3.1.1.3 Repressive Terrorism 
 
Repressive terrorism refers to the systematic use of terror for the purpose of suppressing and 
restraining certain groups, individuals (insurgents or suspected insurgents included) or 
behaviours deemed unacceptable and undesirable by the oppressor.18   
 
1.3.1.1.4 Organizational Terrorism 
 
Organizational terrorism refers to the use of terrorist acts to maintain discipline within an 
organization.  Such terrorist organizations have specific rules and structures, proficient means of 
communication, discipline and a particular recruitment process.  Those who do not follow the 




Counter-terrorism refers to the various policies, tactics and strategies of a government designed 
to limit or prevent the use of terrorism by groups and individuals and to protect the public from 
terrorism.20  Government action spans across numerous policy areas and are carried out by 
almost all government agencies and not only those authorized with law-enforcement, intelligence 




                                                 
 
18 P. Wilkinson, “Concepts of Terror and Terrorism” in Political Terrorism (London: MacMillan Education Ltd, 
1974), 40. The oppressor usually takes the form of the state, state leaders or factions.  Movements also can make use 
of repressive terrorism to coerce and control their own members. 
 
19 W. G. Cunningham, Terrorism: Concepts, Causes and Conflict Resolution, (Virginia: Defence Threat Reduction 
Agency, 2003). 
 
20 M. Taylor, “Effective Counter-Terrorism: A Critical Assessment of European Union Responses” in Quaker 


















The definition of “democracy” differs from one context to another.  For many societies, 
democracy entails individual freedom, rights and collective liberty to resist oppression by the 
governing elites.22  However, by analyzing the origins of the word “democracy”, the term 
denotes a type of regime where political power resides with the people.  Demos refers to “the 
common people” and kratia refers to “power” or “rule”. “Government by consent” (or giving 
power to the common people) is good in itself.  However, the issue is usually how such powers 
are or should be exercised.23 
 
In a democratic regime, the people exercise their political power either directly or indirectly 
through participation, such as through free elections; competition, such as that between political 
parties; and liberty, such as freedom of speech or of assembly.24  Groups compete for power 
openly and legally, without using violence. 
 
1.3.4 Constitutional Democracy 
 
In constitutional democracies, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land which is to be 
defended at all costs.25  The Constitution places limitations on the exercise of state powers and 
offers procedural guarantees to the people.26   
 
Constitutional democracies also emphasize fundamental rights and liberties that protect the 
individual against the powers of the majority.27  These liberties are also protected by a strong 
                                                 
22 P. O’ Neil, “What is Democracy?” in Essentials of Comparison, (New York: W.W. Noron and Company, 2007), 
134. 
 




25 M. Rosenfeld, “The Rule of Law and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy,” Southern Californian Law 
Review, 74 (2001): 1309-1310. 
 
26 R. A. Licht and B. de Villiers, “Introduction” in South Africa’s Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, (Cape Town: 














judiciary that protects the principles of the Constitution.  Through judicial review, the judiciary 
also has the power to overrule the legislature when the law has been violated and to determine 
whether actions are “constitutional”.28 
 
1.4 Structure of the Research Paper 
 
This research paper is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 2 will identify and discuss the 
problems that constitutional democracies face when responding to terrorism. 
 
Chapter 3 will examine the evolution of the strategies used to respond to terrorism in South 
Africa by first examining how the Apartheid government responded to terrorism.    
 
Chapter 4 will discuss PAGAD’s origins, its aims and ideology, its leadership and links with 
other organization as well as its strategies to achieve its aims from its inception in 1996 to its 
decline in 2001. 
 
Chapter 5 will discuss the various responses and the strategies employed by the South African 
government to respond to PAGAD. 
 
The last chapter will reiterate the purpose of the research paper and will make an overall 
conclusion based on the findings in the previous chapters.  The chapter will also illustrate 
whether South Africa’s response to PAGAD was in line with the Constitution and the rule of law 
or whether the response echoed the common problems that constitutional democracies face when 
responding to terrorism. 
 

















COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE THEMES 
 
The basic objective of strategies used to respond to terrorism in constitutional democracies is to 
defend the community’s democratic way of life while ensuring that the liberties and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution are not undermined.  This chapter will identify and discuss the most 
serious problems of responding to terrorism in constitutional democratic contexts. 
 
2.1 Counter-Terrorist Strategies in Constitutional Democracies 
 
If not curtailed, terrorism causes countless deaths, it leads to individuals’ public liberties being 
inhibited, human rights violations and disruptions of institutions in constitutional democracies.  It 
also prevents elected representatives from carrying out their duties and prohibits the civil society 
from progressing.29  To respond to terrorism, democracies employ numerous policies and 
strategies that uphold constitutional principles and the rule of law.30   
 
There is no consensus on the best method or policy in terms of responding to terrorism.  
However, two models, the “criminal justice model” and the “military model”, are prominent, 
each with their costs and benefits.31  The criminal justice model views terrorism as a crime and 
the onus of response is placed within the bounds of the state’s criminal legal system.  The 
military model views terrorism as an act of warfare.32  The onus of response is placed on the 
                                                 
29 P. Chalk, “The Response to terrorism as a threat to Constitutional democracies,” Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 44, 3 (1998): 373. 
 
30 Ibid.  As terrorism poses a threat to democracies, they should respond to terrorism in a firm manner and through 
effective counter-terrorist measures that will ensure that the terrorists do not persist beyond their initial emergence.  
Not to do so would be to undermine the very basis that establishes the criminality of terrorism in the first place and 
would pose an even greater threat to the political and civil traditions that are central to the democratic way of life. 
 
31 R. D. Crelinstein, “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Constitutional democracies,” Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 44, 1 (1998): 399. 
  
32 P. Chalk, “The Response to terrorism as a threat to Constitutional democracies,” Australian Journal of Politics 













military which makes use of retaliatory strikes, campaigns of retribution and troop deployment.  
Thus, the maximal use of force to overpower the enemy is emphasized.33   
 
In the criminal justice model, the notion that no one within the polity be above the law is upheld 
and, by using police force to respond to terrorism, the act is criminalized (this allows terrorists to 
be treated fairly and to be able to defend themselves in the court of law) and the use of force is 
limited.   
One of the main reasons why democratic governments use these models is because a fixed 
definition of “terrorism” does not exist.  While some governments perceive terrorism as a 
criminal act, others perceive it as an act of warfare.  Accordingly, this uncertainty results in 
democracies employing inappropriate policies and strategies to respond to terrorism.   
2.1.1 The Criminal Justice Model 
In constitutional democracies, if the criminal justice model is chosen to respond to terrorism, it is 
because, first, terrorism is viewed as a criminal act and not war.34   This is why the police have 
been given the responsibility of containing and responding to terrorism.  They have also been 
given this responsibility because tasks such as the penetration of cells, the tailing of suspects and 
the forensic analysis and searches of suspected terrorist lodgings fall under standard police 
activity.35  
 
Second, the choice is based on the fact that the criminal justice model aims to protect civilians 
and uphold constitutional principles.  The model also provides institutions and measures (such as 
courts and international agreements) that ensure that terrorists will be prosecuted and punished.36   




34 D. P. Lackey, The Good Soldier versus the Good Cop: Counterterrorism as Police Work. 
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu, Accessed 18th March, 2008.   War refers to organized political violence that leads to at 
least 1,000 deaths per annum.  It can either be an intrastate war (the wars occur within a country) or an interstate war 




36 F. Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism,” Australian Journal of 













A third reason for choosing the criminal justice model is because experience has revealed that 
reliance on the military model to respond to terror is ineffective and has the potential to lead to 
human rights violations. Yet, the criminal justice model also cannot ensure that terrorism will not 
occur in the future37 and it can also lead to the violation of constitutional principles.38  When 
using the model, overreactions may occur as well as deformations such as the misinterpretation 
of rules and rights39 and the establishment of “special” procedures and institutions (such as 
special courts) to respond to terrorism.40  By establishing special courts, terrorism is not 
perceived as a criminal act and terrorists are differentiated from other criminals.  Hence, the 
special treatment of suspected terrorists is allowed.  For instance, within special courts, 
internment without trial has been advocated, the rights of the defence have been limited and 
cross-examination has been excluded.41   These aspects have denied the terrorists their rights.42 
Moreover, to effectively respond to terrorism, its root causes need to be addressed.  The criminal 
justice model does not do this.  It is a short-term solution.43 
    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
37 P. Wilkinson, “Countering ‘Spasm’ Terrorism” in Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: MacMillan 
Education Ltd, 1986), 148. Terrorism is not confined to borders and is increasingly making use of modern 
technology and methods that the police cannot comprehend and efficiently monitor.  Even if special anti-terrorism 
units are established, these units usually have inadequate financial resources or manpower to respond to terrorism 




39 P. Chalk, “The Response to terrorism as a threat to Constitutional democracies,” Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 44, 3 (1998): 377. 
 
40 R. D. Crelinstein. and A. P. Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet”, in 
Responses To Terrorism (London: Franck Cass, 1993), 334. 
 
41 F. Reinares, “Democratic Regimes, Internal Security Policy and the Threat of Terrorism,” Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 44, 6 (1998): 362-364. 
42 For instance, Israel is the only democratic country which openly allows presumed terrorists to be subjected to 
torture and other form of physical pressure to obtain information. Such techniques have been justified by the 
authorities on the basis of the unusual degree of violence they face.  Nevertheless, these practices violate human and 
civil rights and are condemned by the 1987 International Treaty that made torture illegal.   
 
43 R. D. Crelinstein. and A. P. Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet”, in 














2.1.2 The Military Model 
 
In the “military model”, the military, which is disciplined and has specialized skills and 
resources, is used to respond to terrorism.   First, military intervention allows constitutional 
democracies to protect their strategic institutions (potential terrorist targets).  Second, it prevents 
terrorist plots and allows terrorists’ facilities to be attacked with speed and flexibility.44  Third, 
the military model also makes it possible to strike out at international terrorists and those who are 
sponsoring and training them.45   
Yet, despite these strengths, like the criminal justice model, the military model also has its 
weaknesses.  For instance, the utilization of military force is rarely successful at stopping 
terrorism over time and it leads to the violation of constitutional principles.46 
First, by using the military model to respond to terrorism, governments demonstrate that they do 
not perceive terrorism as a tactic, a method of warfare and a means to an end.  By not realizing 
this, the threat becomes over-personalized.  The target becomes an ideology, a group or a person 
and military analogies such as the “War on Terror” (WOT) emerge, thus giving a sense that 
victory is at hand.47  While these are attractive tools to publicize the threat and gain support to 
use the military to respond to terrorism, they are short-term solutions.48   
Second, using military force to respond to terror also has the potential to increase international 
alienation and it results in more terrorist acts taking place as opposed to deterring and hindering 
                                                 
44 C. Lum, L. Kennedy and A.. J. Sherley, Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies, 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org, Accessed 3rd April, 2008.   
 
45 R. D. Crelinstein. and A. P. Schmid, “Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet”, in 
Responses To Terrorism (London: Franck Cass, 1993), 333. 
 
46 C. Lum, L. Kennedy and A. J. Sherley, Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies, 
http://www.campbellcollaboration.org, Accessed 3rd April, 2008.   
 
47 USIP, The Diplomacy of Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Disputed, http://www.usip.org, 
Accessed 2nd April, 2008. 
 
48 D. P. Lackey, The Good Soldier versus the Good Cop: Counterterrorism as Police Work. 














them.   Military force tends to drive existing groups further underground and has the capacity to 
lock the government into an unproductive encounter with terrorists that may escalate.49 
Third, this model allows the military to enter domestic politics.  This may increase resentment in 
the already-volatile community and civilians may become dependent on the presence of the 
military for their protection.  Also, human rights violations can take place because, unlike the 
police, military officials do not place emphasis on prosecution and punishment.50  They utilize 
methods that are unacceptable in constitutional democracies (they make use of intrusive 
surveillance techniques, secrecy, covert operations and similar).51 
 
Fourth, when using the military model to respond to terrorism, the modern trend has been to use 
the criminal justice model as well.52  This is another mistake since using both leads to the 
blurring of military and police services.  As police forces become more militarized, the military 
assumes more policing functions.53  This is contrary to democratic values and is incompatible 
with the military needs of flexibility and surprise.54  
 
In view of the above, like the criminal model, the military model can be chosen to respond to 
terrorism in constitutional democracies.55  Both models have their strengths and their flaws.  
Hence, they are not a zero-sum game.  They tend to abuse civil rights and the rule of law and are 
short-term solutions to the problem of terrorism.  Even if the two models acting singly are 
                                                 
49 G. L. Neuman, “Comment, Counter-Terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law,” The European Journal of 
International Law, 15, 5 (2004): 1019-1029. 
 
50 P. Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). 
This dependence on the military may make the military unable or unwilling to withdraw from the state at a later 
stage. 
 
51 R. D. Crelinstein, “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-Terrorism in Constitutional democracies,” Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, 44, 1 (1998): 410-411. 
 
52 G. L. Neuman, “Comment, Counter-Terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law,” The European Journal of 




54 M. L. Cook, Ethical Issues in Counterterrorism Warfare, http://www.ethics.sandiego.edu, Accessed 10th April, 
2008. 
 
55 USIP, The Diplomacy of Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Disputed, http://www.usip.org, 













insufficient to effectively respond to terror, problems like leadership role also arise when the two 
models are combined.  Nevertheless, for domestic terrorism, the best option would be the 
criminal justice model.   
 
2.2 The Problem of “Overreaction” 
 
When confronting the threat of terrorism, “overreactions” pose a risk to all states.  
“Overreaction” refers to the situation when one reacts with unnecessary or inappropriate force, 
emotional display, or violence.  Overreactions are more problematic for constitutional 
democracies because they abuse constitutional principles, threaten essential rights and liberties 
and governments make extreme and unjustified departures from conventional judicial and law 
enforcement procedures.56  Consequently, the state is drawn into an area in which the terrorist 
operates.  The criminal justice system becomes politicized and the rules and rights are 
misinterpreted or disregarded.57  Additionally, if not reversed or checked, overreactions cause 
more damage than the terrorists and can play into the hands of the terrorists by giving credence 
to the claim that democracies are shams.  This allows the terrorists to pose as the defenders of the 
citizens instead of the democratic state. 
 
Overreactions are a direct consequence of the fear experienced during and after a terrorist attack.  
When people are afraid, they become hysterical, paranoid and vengeful.  These emotions then 
become an ill-informed fear which then leads to overreaction.58  Then, the desire to obtain quick 
results is preceded by the notion that “anything goes” because the negative emotions produced 
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during a terrorist attack undermine the capacity of individuals and institutions to make impartial 
judgments about risk and fairness.59 
 
Overreaction also occurs as a result of the tensions that exist among the institutions devising the 
strategies to respond to terrorism.  These institutions compete with each other, hence the result is 
a confused response influenced by the institutions’ self-interests as well as fear.  Consequently, it 
is the “overreactions”, not the terrorist act, that cause historically-significant changes such as the 
overriding of civil liberties and inadvertently giving publicity to encourage the use of 
undemocratic methods in response to terrorism.60 
 
This is illustrated by the Uruguayan government’s fight against the Tupamaros (or the MLN)61 
and the US government’s reaction to the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001 
(9/11).  During these events, constitutional rights and liberties were disregarded, severe damage 
was caused by the government’s overreactions rather than the terrorists and the overreactions 
played into the hands of the terrorists. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the MLN engaged in urban terrorist activities against the 
Uruguayan government which overreacted to the situation.  It allowed the military to intervene 
and enter domestic politics, a state of emergency was declared and all constitutional safeguards 
were repealed to counter the movement.62  Individuals were wrongfully imprisoned and tortured 
and demonstrations were brutally repressed.63  Undoubtedly, these acts violated the Constitution, 
they caused more devastation than the actions of the MLN and provoked the MLN to become 
more violent.  Thus, the overreactions had worked against the government.   
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With regards to 9/11, the overreactions that ensued undermined the US Constitution and the rule 
of law.64  As a result of the overreactions, two on-going preventive wars (the WOT) in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have occurred and the strategies devised have been counter-productive, 
they have made more individuals join terrorist organizations and they have violated the rule of 
proportionality65 and international law.66  Furthermore, the military model67 has been allowed to 
override the criminal justice model and the use of torture and rendition at the international level 
has been rationalized.68  Additionally, a new detention and interrogation system that is outside 
the legal rules has been established,69 government agencies have been exempted from the 
regulations outlined in the Convention against Torture Act and government officials have been 
sanctioned to physically and psychologically torment the detainees.70 
 
The overreactions to 9/11 have also led to many deaths, economic losses and population 
alienation, xenophobia, racial, religious or ethnic intolerance and division.71   
 
Undoubtedly, measures to respond to terrorism are important.  However, if overreactions occur, 
they will prove to be more detrimental than terrorism itself.  For democracies, overreactions 
result in constitutional liberties and rights being abused and misinterpreted, they prevent the state 
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from responding to terrorism in a proportional manner and, they can cause more damage to states 
than the terrorists themselves if not reversed or checked.   
 
2.3 Vulnerabilities of Constitutional Democracies 
 
2.3.1 Constitutional Democracies and their Vulnerability to Terrorist attacks 
 
Constitutional democracies are prone to terrorist attacks because of their permissive environment 
which involves economic, social and political freedoms.72  Terrorists exploit such freedoms and 
use their democratic rights to spread their ideologies through associations and organizations that 
they are able to establish.73  The freedom of movement, for instance, allows the terrorist to cross 
borders, to escape police surveillance and to move weapons and individuals from one place to 
another.74  This is not possible in states where liberties are limited.  For example, when Spain 
was an authoritarian regime, the ETA75 operated to a lesser extent than when Spain became a 
democracy.76 Democratic Spain’s permissive environment facilitated the ETA in engaging in 
terrorism. 
 
Terrorists also take full advantage of the technological advancements and the freedom of media 
found in constitutional democracies.77   While terrorists are able to portray their cause as “just” 
and the state as “oppressive” through the media, technological advancements allow terrorists to 
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disrupt the stability of constitutional democracies and to sabotage their essential services such as 
power plants and computer and communications systems.78    
 
Terrorists also take advantage of minority groups or constituencies that are aggrieved and 
unhappy with the status quo in democracies.79  By making promises and delivering to them what 
political leaders cannot, terrorists are able to recruit their supporters and members from such 
groups.  Unlike democratic leaders and officials, terrorists do not have the complications of 
responsibility and their authority and power are not defined and limited by legal-constitutional 
terms. 
 
Additionally, terrorists take advantage of the fact that constitutional democracies are bound to 
respect fundamental civil liberties and to govern within judicial and constitutional restraints.  
They cannot respond ruthlessly against the terrorists and, whatever course of action is 
undertaken, the Constitution and the rule of law must be upheld.80  Moreover, even if a 
consensus has been reached about the course of action that needs to be taken, strategies devised 
to respond to terrorism in democracies usually have to pass through judicial review.  They are 
either then paralyzed by inaction or “under-reaction”.  Both work to the advantage of the 
terrorists.81 
 
The permissive environment of constitutional democracies is also taken advantage by hostile 
foreign states and foreign-based terrorist groups.82  Such groups and states usually disagree with 
the principles of constitutional democracies hence, they provide indirect and covert support to 
terrorists that are operating within such states.  When this happens, constitutional democracies 
are helpless unless they are prepared to accept the consequences of confronting the foreign states 
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and foreign-based terrorist groups.  It is for this reason that there are now more international 
agreements on the issue of terrorism and many states have entered into agreements for 
extradition of terrorists.83 
 
On the whole, constitutional democracies are vulnerable to terrorist attacks due to the liberties 
and principles that they hold.  Terrorists thrive in such permissive environments as opposed to 
regions where freedoms and liberties are severely limited.  To respond to terrorism without using 
unconstitutional methods, such democracies execute various preventive measures to respond to 
terrorism. 
 
2.3.2 “Prevention better than Cure’’ 
 
As preventive measures to terrorism, constitutional democracies make use of “hard-line” and 
“soft-line” approaches.  In this section, both approaches and the mechanisms that can suppress 
and prevent terrorism from occurring in constitutional democracies will be discussed.   
 
2.3.2.1 Hard-line Approaches 
 
“Hard-line” approaches entail the deployment of the military, economic sanctions towards 
terrorist states and the utilization of legal-repressive means.  These include severe prison 
sentences such as the death sentence for terrorists.84  However, it is important to point out that 
the “hard-line” approach is usually used to counter transnational terrorism.  For instance, military 
strikes and economic sanctions have been employed by democratic states against “rogue states” 
due to the belief that these rogue states harbor terrorists and terrorist organizations. 
 
                                                 
83 An interesting case to be followed is the extradition request made by India to Pakistan in connection with the 
terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. 
 
84 P. Wilkinson, “Vulnerabilities of Liberal Societies” in Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: MacMillan 














The main aim of the “hard-line” approach is to reduce the prevalence of terrorist attacks by 
targeting the terrorists, their resources and their supporters directly.  This aim is carried out even 
if it involves attacking and imposing sanctions on another state.85 
 
2.3.2.2 Soft-line Approaches 
 
“Soft-line” approaches to prevent and contain terrorism in constitutional democracies include 
protecting potential terrorist targets, using diplomacy, educational support and advanced 
technology as helpful tools in reducing terrorist attacks and addressing the grievances of 
minority groups by governments.86  Addressing the grievances of minority groups is not easy 
because these grievances are different in nature and have different root causes.87  In addition, by 
giving in to the demands of a particular minority group, dissent between opposing minority 
groups and between the groups and the government may occur.  However, through regular 
democratic elections and reforms, addressing and diluting grievances can be achieved.  This will 
reduce the possibility of conflict, violence and outbreaks of terrorist acts and it will hinder 
terrorists from gathering support.88 
 
The deployment of internal defence forces and the constant gathering of intelligence on terrorists 
and terrorist organizations is another “soft-line” approach.89  Intelligence enables terrorists to be 
detected and monitored as well as their sources of financial support.  Once this information is 
obtained, democracies can freeze terrorist assets, infiltrate terrorist groups and prevent terrorist 
attacks.  However, intelligence gathering in constitutional democracies also has weaknesses.  
The intelligence and law enforcement agencies compete with each other, making nation-wide 
intelligence difficult to obtain.  Additionally, there are occasions when techniques of surveillance 
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and intelligence do not respect constitutional principles and are unable to prevent terrorism from 
developing beyond the incipient stage.90  This is because, in constitutional democracies, 
subversion is not perceived as a threat even though the trend has been that a campaign of 
defamation and subversive propaganda against democratic values, institutions and leadership 
precedes the development of a terrorist campaign.91  However, through competent police 
agencies and strategies, terrorism can be prevented from developing beyond the incipient stage.92  
For instance, they can disrupt the internal cohesion of the terrorist organization, thus preventing 
it from expanding.  If this occurs, then the state has been successful in containing and preventing 
terrorism.  However, if the organization grows and the perception exists that the state and 
internal forces are ineffective at containing violence, then there is a possibility of vigilante 
groups using terrorism arising to solve their perceived problems. 
 
On the whole, the main goal of preventive measures is to weaken the terrorists and to be “one 
step ahead” of them so that they are unable to strike.  Even though preventive measures in 
democracies can be challenging, there are many mechanisms in place that can contain and 
prevent terrorism from occurring.  If the group or individuals using terrorism do not expand, then 
the problem of terrorism in constitutional democracies is at least contained.  However, it is 
important to note that the decrease in groups or individuals using terrorism may not necessarily 
be due to the strategies used by the government but to their own internal weaknesses. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
There are several issues that constitutional democracies face when responding to terrorism.  
First, the “criminal justice model” and the “military model” are prominent.  Used jointly or 
singly, each model has their strengths and weaknesses. 
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Additionally, terrorism inherently invites an overreaction by states.  In democracies, 
overreactions are more problematic because they lead to constitutional liberties being abused and 
rules and rights being misinterpreted; they prevent constitutional democracies from responding 
to terrorism in a proportional manner; and, if not reversed or checked, they can cause more 
damage to states than the terrorists. 
 
Moreover, constitutional democracies provide a permissive environment for terrorism to occur 
and are constrained in their response to terrorism.  Yet, preventing or responding to terrorism is 
possible in constitutional democracies as there are various measures within the intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies which can be effectively utilized.  The impact of these measures can 
be assessed by observing the terrorist organizations’ expansion.  At times, however, the 
government’s actions may have little to do with the decline of terrorist organizations because 
terrorist organizations can destroy themselves.   
 
Finally, if the government does not respond appropriately to certain situations or they do not 





























A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM 
 
Terrorism is not new to South Africa.  It developed during the Apartheid era and was a tool used 
both by the state and the opponents of Apartheid.  This chapter will examine the evolution of the 
strategies used to respond to terrorism in South Africa and the impact of the present security 
legislature in terms of responding to terrorism. 
 
3.1 Responding to Terrorism during Apartheid  
 
3.1.1 Apartheid South Africa 
 
Apartheid was institutionalized by the Nationalist Party (NP) in 1948.93  It was a repressive, 
racial-capitalist state that had inherited the Westminster model of parliamentary representative 
democracy.  Within this democracy, a bill of rights was absent, the judiciary could not exercise 
powers of judicial review and the legislature was dominated by the executive which, in turn, was 
dominated by bureaucratic administration.94  Moreover, Apartheid was only applicable to the 
minority white population and it emphasized on “parliamentary sovereignty” and legislative 
supremacy.95  Racial discrimination was legalized,96 thus, the majority of the population (black) 
had their rights revoked while the minority (whites) held power in the government.97   
 
                                                 
93 TRC Report, The state inside South Africa between 1960 and 1990, http://www.doj.gov.za, Accessed 28th May, 
2008.   
 
94  Ibid. 
 
95 G. Mare, “The State of the State: Contestation and Race in Re-assertion in a Neoliberal terrain” in State of a 
Nation: South Africa 2003-2004, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003), 25-52. 
 
96 P. Vale, “Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa”, International Center for Advanced 
Studies, 9 (September 2003): 2. 
 
97 P. Gastrow, Organised Crime in South Africa: An Assessment of its nature and origin, http://www.issafrica.org, 














3.1.2 Responding to Terrorism during Apartheid 
As a result of the repressive laws of the Apartheid regime, from the 1960s to 1990s, protests, 
riots and terrorism occurred. To respond to this unrest, the government adopted a number of 
security policies and executed certain anti-terrorism measures.  These policies and measures 
became draconian when the perceived threat of a communist-inspired, black dominated 
overthrow of the white minority government increased.98  For instance, terrorism was broadly 
defined (common criminal behaviour was included as terrorist activity) so that the government 
could easily control and suppress democratic black opposition to white minority domination.99  
Moreover, the detention laws made detention a permanent feature instead of an emergency law.  
“Preventive detention” was authorized without trial for up to 12 months, visitation was limited 
and, unlike the previous detention laws, the public was not entitled to information about the 
detainees.  Their identities were withheld and were killed for official “legal reasons”.100   
 
Even when the laws pertaining to terrorism were revised, they incorporated remnants of the 
numerous existing anti-terrorism laws and authorized the Minister of Law and Order to declare 
any organization unlawful if he was satisfied that it engaged in activities that endangered the 
security of the state or the maintenance of law and order, or promoted the spread of communism.  
The main aim of the security legislation and the laws pertaining to terrorism during Apartheid 
was to silence the growing opposition and protest.  “Terrorism”101 was equated with the political 
identity of the opposition, thus the laws criminalized and outlawed opposition to the status quo 
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and ensured that they were forbidden to engage in political activity and were denied the 
democratic rights that the whites enjoyed. 102 
 
As groups violently opposed the Apartheid regime, “counter-terrorist” and “counter-
revolutionary” policies and legislature became increasingly draconian to the point that civil 
liberties and human rights abuses occurred.  Both overt and covert operations were used to kill 
“terrorists”.  While overt operations were known to the public and performed in accordance with 
the “criminal justice model”, covert operations, performed by “hit squads”, were supported by 
secret budgets and resources, without public accountability.103  State officials were allowed to 
repress, dispossess and humiliate citizens on a massive scale legally and illegally and security 
laws were also passed to grant indemnity to those conducting the covert operations.104   
The overt operations involved security establishments such as the South African Police (SAP), 
the South African Defence Force (SADF), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and homeland 
police forces.105  Each agency had a specific task and structure in terms of responding to 
terrorism and enforcing the repressive laws.106  They excelled in infiltration and other features of 
the criminal justice approach. However, when the Apartheid state became unstable and 
opposition and social movements increased, conventional policing was not enough.107  The 
government then undertook several reforms.  This sparked more anti-Apartheid protests as well 
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as the use of terrorism by vigilante organizations108 against anti-Apartheid activists which was 
supported by the government and the police.109  
By the mid-1980s, the use of terrorism by vigilante organizations took on the form of “symbolic 
terror”.110  In the light of this situation and to make the Apartheid state “ungovernable”, the 
opposition gathered more support and developed an effective revolutionary strategy that made 
use of terrorism.111  Under the notion of “Total Strategy”,112 the security establishments and 
agencies were reorganized so that they could effectively respond to the terrorism used by the 
opposition. 
   
“Total Strategy” reinforced the notion that South Africa was involved in a civil war. It also 
blurred the boundaries between the military and civil society, legitimized military involvement 
and covert operations against the “enemies” in South Africa113 and allowed state agents to deal 
with terrorists in any way they deemed fit.  This gave the seal of approval on the various “hit 
squads” that emerged during Apartheid.114    
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Broken up into smaller units with independent chains of command, the hit squads consisted of 
experts in communication, surveillance, wiretapping, weapons, explosives and chemicals115 and 
were used as a means of last resort to eliminate political opponents and to cripple their 
structures.116 For instance, the covert “counter-insurgency” hit squad Section Cl, which was 
incorporated into the SAP,117 had agreements with other covert units such as the Civil 
Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and the Directorate of Covert Collection (DCC) to eliminate 
terrorists.118  The DCC covered most of the covert operations.  The CCB, a covert unit of the 
SADF, was created to circumvent sanctions and to eliminate anti-Apartheid activists and their 
facilities worldwide.119   
Another section, C2, exchanged information with security branches such as the Military and the 
National Intelligence branch.  Incorporated into C2 was the counter-revolutionary target 
information unit Teenrewolusionere Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS).120  Once the target was 
revealed by TREWITS, C1 then carried out the orders by means of bombing, torturing or 
murdering the targets. 
Overall, the above outlines tactics used by the Apartheid government as well vigilante groups to 
respond to terror.  In addition to the “criminal justice model”, the Apartheid government also 
used illegal coercive and harsh methods.  While these methods undoubtedly undermined the rule 
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3.2 Responding to Terrorism in Democratic South Africa 
 
3.2.1 Democratic South Africa 
As a constitutional democracy, South Africa emphasizes the protection individuals’ liberties and 
rights. The Constitution of South Africa is the supreme law of the land which the government is 
obliged to defend.  No other law or government action can supersede the provisions outlined in 
the Constitution.121  It has established an inclusive democratic order in the state and is the source 
of its legitimacy, it has created institutions to give citizens direct or indirect call on the state for 
protection and it has committed democratic South Africa to non-sexism, non-racism and non-
discrimination.122 
Moreover, unlike during Apartheid when criminal procedure was subject to the sovereignty of 
parliament and the executive, the Constitution has limited the legislative power of parliament and 
has given the judiciary a fundamental role in testing and validating laws and in preventing abuse 
of the criminal justice system by the state.123  As this is the case, the rights of all individuals are 
protected.  Furthermore, this ensures that the discretionary power that was pivotal in creating the 
possibility for abuse in the past is also monitored.124 
3.2.2 Responding to Terrorism in Democratic South Africa 
As the Constitution of South Africa aims to protect the liberties and rights of individuals, in 
terms of security and responding to terrorism democratically, the new government went to great 
lengths during the transition to revise and reformulate the security legislation so that it was 
consistent with the Constitution.125  For instance, the present notion of security emphasizes that 
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all individuals are able to live in freedom, peace and safety in South Africa.  In addition, it 
incorporates political, economic, social and environmental issues at the domestic and 
international level, it contains laws that aim to protect the country’s internal security against 
terrorism and related criminal activities, it allows the state to restrict gatherings and 
demonstrations and it enhances the state’s power to collect information on terrorist organizations 
and crime syndicates.126  
 
Legislation also allows the state to target terrorism’s foot soldiers and its sources of funding and 
to protect certain modes and places of transport from potential terrorist attacks by regulating the 
use of firearms, explosives and ammunitions.127  In addition, suspected terrorists are allowed to 
have equal rights, a fair trial and to be presumed innocent pending conviction.128 
 
To respond to terrorism, the present security legislature also requires South Africa to cooperate 
with and support the international community in eradicating terrorism129 and it required the 
formulation and implementation of a new official policy on terrorism.  This policy, approved in 
1998, placed emphasis on the rule of law, the freedom and defence of South African citizens and 
prevented any form of repression.130   
 
As South Africa views terrorist acts as criminal acts which should be dealt within the framework 
of the criminal justice system, new security establishments were created and existing ones were 
restructured, thus ensuring that the Constitution would be respected and human rights abuses 
would not occur when responding to terrorism.131   
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The new and restructured security establishments include the South African Secret Service 
(SASS), the South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA).  While the SAPS is responsible for 
information exchange on crime including terrorism, the development of police training courses 
aimed at responding to the challenges of  terrorism and police cooperation with other countries, 
the NIA is responsible for domestic intelligence and counter-intelligence.132 
The SANDF defends the country against external and internal threats133 and has a limited role in 
democratic South Africa.134  It is also responsible for counter-intelligence measures and it 
supplies foreign military intelligence relating to national strategic intelligence to the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Committee (NICOC).135  NICOC is responsible for the coordination of 
intelligence supplied by the intelligence divisions of the SANDF, the SAPS, the NIA and the 
SASS.136  The tactics used and the information gathered are useful for preventing terrorist 
attacks. 
Overall, while legislation has been enacted and revised to uphold constitutional principles and to 
break away from the Apartheid notion of security, the reality is that the security legislation and 
security establishments in democratic South Africa have their share of flaws which may not be 
able to uphold the country’s constitutional principles. This is problematic as constitutional 
democracies like South Africa are already constrained in their actions when responding to 
terrorism.  Additionally, most of the measures devised to respond to terrorism in such 
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for socio-economic and other secondary purposes, but its primary and essential mission is the conventional function 
of defence against external military aggression.  For democratic South Africa, the new approach to security does not 
imply an expansive role for the armed forces and the Defence Force is no longer the dominant security institution 
and remains an important security instrument of last resort. 
135 South African Government Information, Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South 
Africa: Defence in a Democracy,  http;//www.gov.za, Accessed 25th October, 2008.  NICOC was established under 















democracies struggle to pass the test of judicial review.  Therefore, if the security legislation and 
security establishments in democratic South Africa are inadequate, then constitutional principles 
will be violated.   
 
Moreover, despite revising the security legislation, it still has remnants of the Apartheid 
legislation. 
 
When SAPS was restructured, it inherited abusive and biased policing.137  This has caused 
several problems that range from ineffective crime-fighting and corruption to ineffective 
coordination and the utilization of assault and torture.138 
 
Furthermore, while the NIA helps in combating criminal activities, it has a wide mandate which 
illustrates that the agency is not constrained in its actions.  It has used intrusive surveillance 
methods that are illegal (thus, the NIA engages in domestic spying, something that is rare in 
constitutional democracies) and it “bends the rules” when deemed “necessary”.139  Undoubtedly, 
this is unconstitutional.   
 
While positive changes have been made within the security legislation in South Africa, there are 
still many problems that may hinder the response to terrorism in a constitutional and democratic 
manner.  Not only is the NIA involved in unconstitutional acts, the police are prone to methods 
and tactics that abuse human rights and the revised security legislation has remnants of the 
Apartheid legislation.  This is problematic and illustrates the fact that policy-makers in South 
Africa find it difficult to move away from Apartheid policies.  This notion is further illustrated 
when South Africa’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATB) was drafted in 2001. 
 
                                                 
137 J. Rauch, “Police Transformation and the South African TRC”, Race and Citizenship in Transition Series, 
(2004): 13-14. 
 
138 K. Gottschalk, “Vigilantism v. The State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000,” Institute of 
Security Studies Papers, 99, (February 2005):  8. 
 
139 The Mail and Guardian, 26th September 2008. Intelligence agencies during Apartheid were not constrained in 
their activities and methods however, in democracies, intelligence is to be constrained so that individuals’ rights and 














3.2.3 Anti-Terrorism Bill: The Flaws 
 
As result of international pressure and PAGAD activities, a tougher anti-terrorism legislation 
was called for in 2001.  This led to the drafting of the ATB which went through a process of 
rigorous public and parliamentary scrutiny as a result of South Africa’s past.  The ATB had to 
adhere to the Constitution and promote civil and human rights.  However, it failed to achieve 
this.  The ATB broadly defined terrorism as a calculated act used to intimidate and coerce the 
general public or government, disrupt any public service and create unrest in any state.140  
Hence, common criminals and law-breakers could be defined as terrorists as well as trade 
unionists and those who destroy public property such as public telephones.141  
                                                
The ATB had remnants of the Apartheid security legislation.  For instance, a person suspected of 
withholding information from a law enforcement officer could be detained without bail for 14 
days unless a judge issued his or her release.142  Even though the ATB included several 
safeguards for the detainees, detaining individuals for withholding information from a law 
enforcement officer is drastic.  For instance, journalists and lawyers would have been detained 
for “withholding information” yet, based on confidentiality regulations, they are prohibited from 
sharing certain information.143   
The reintroduction of detaining individuals without charges also carried a risk of a repetition of 
past behaviours.  While some may maintain that detainees in democratic South Africa will be 
treated differently from how they would have been treated during Apartheid, the numerous 
complaints issued to the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) relating to police treatment 





141 M. Schonteich, “Back to the Future? New South African Anti-Terror Law”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 14, 

















of deaths were suicides, severe injuries, injuries that were inflicted prior to custody (by police) 
and police negligence.144   
Another flaw within the ATB was that police officers and those of higher ranks were authorized 
to use their “special powers” in their area of authority to search vehicles and individuals.145  
While this may seem reasonable, abuse of authority would have occurred, undermining people’s 
rights. 
It is clear that the proposed ATB was rather flawed conceptually and theoretically and was 
unrealistic in its aims.  First, the ATB was designed to deal with a specific situation, that being 
terrorism by PAGAD.  Therefore, it was narrow in its scope and did not take into consideration 
how terrorism could evolve and how it could be prevented the future. 
Second, the quality of the investigation of crime in South Africa is inadequate to tackle the issues 
outlined in the ATB.  There is a lack of resources that hinders the investigation process, thus 
making thorough investigation impossible.  While countless crimes are reported to the police on 
a daily basis, only a few are investigated and go to courts, resulting in few convictions.146   
Third, even though initiatives were taken to improve the operational capacity of the detective and 
prosecution services, these proved fruitless in the long run.147  For instance, the witness 
protection program that was launched was ineffective148 and the successful Directorate of 
Special Operations (“The Scorpions”)149 was disbanded in 2008 for political reasons.  






145 Ibid, 12. 
 
146 M. Schonteich, “Back to the Future? New South African Anti-Terror Law”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 14, 




148 Witnesses were harassed by protection officers, they were given insufficient support by the program and were 
scared to provide information. 
 
149 Launched in September 1999 to combat organized and economic crimes, corruption within the criminal justice 













On the whole, the ATB had numerous flaws and did not adhere to the Constitution.  These flaws, 
coupled with the fact that South Africa was not fully equipped to deal with terrorism as 
effectively and efficiently as it should, led to the rejection of the ATB and its replacement by the 





The Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorism and Related Activities 
(POCDATARA) law came into being after a lengthy and controversial drafting process which 
can be traced back to 1995 after the democratic transition in the country.   As discussed earlier, 
the security laws at the time were flawed and needed to be reviewed, especially after the internal 
violence during the late 1990s.  Even the ATB, which was supposed to assist democratic South 
Africa to respond to terrorism, had numerous flaws and did not adhere to the Constitution.  As a 
result, the ATB was rejected by Parliament.  The POCDATARA was then drafted and passed by 
Parliament in 2004 and implemented in 2005 following presidential signature.150 
 
While POCDATARA also has some inconsistencies,151 it presently provides the overall legal 
framework for counter-terrorism in South Africa. The Ministry of Safety and Security has the 
main responsibility for its implementation.152 
 
Unlike the ATB, the POCDATARA adheres to the rules and regulations stipulated in the 
Constitution.  By using appropriate lawful and proportionate measures, the POCDATARA seeks 
to prevent acts of terror and to bring terrorists to justice. It also aims to protect the whole 
                                                 
150 UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter Terrorism Issues Preliminary findings 
on Visit to South Africa, http://www.un.org , Accessed 26th October, 2008. 
 
151 While many maintain that the legislation is necessary to meet the country’s legal obligations in terms of the 
ratified terrorism conventions, others claim that the Act poses an immediate threat to some of the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed in the 1996 Constitution and that, due to the fact that all the violent activity associated with 
terrorism is a crime and South Africa’s present security legislation is able to respond to terrorism and related 
criminal activity, the Act is unnecessary.  
 
152 UN Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter Terrorism Issues Preliminary findings 














population from acts of terror in South Africa. However, it seeks to avoid making concessions 
that could encourage extortion by terrorists. It also prohibits South Africa being used as a haven 
for terrorism.  The POCDATARA requires South Africa to cooperate with and support the 
international community in preventing and combating terrorism.  In the event of terrorism in a 
foreign country involving South African citizens, South Africa is required to cooperate with the 
host government to resolve the matter.153  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
 
Responding to terrorism in democratic South Africa is important but, in doing so, the protection 
and promotion of human rights is a priority.  In order to combat terrorism effectively and protect 
its internal security, South Africa has taken many initiatives such as signing international treaties 
and revising its security legislation. Yet, there are still several problems to be addressed within 
the revised security legislation if terrorism in South Africa is to be countered “democratically” 
and constitutionally.  Not only does the SAPS and the NIA pose problems in South Africa, but 
the revised legislation has remnants of the Apartheid legislation.  Also, professional security 
services are absent in South Africa, especially in the SAPS, which makes crime-fighting 
ineffective in South Africa and those who complain about ineffective crime-fighting being 
targeted by the police using anti-terrorism legislation.   
                                                 
153 M. Schonteich, “Back to the Future? New South African Anti-Terror Law”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 14, 















PEOPLE AGAINST GANGSTERISM AND DRUGS (PAGAD) 
 
South Africa witnessed a wave of terrorism concentrated mainly in Cape Town from 1996 to 
2001.  No one claimed responsibility for these acts but the authorities blamed members from 
PAGAD.  PAGAD emerged in 1996 out of some of the most violent, drug and crime-infested 
Coloured communities in Cape Town.154  However the organization had declined by 2001.155  
This chapter critically examines the evolution of PAGAD from 1996 to 2001 and analyzes the 
causes of its deviation from its vigilante objectives to using terrorism to achieve its goals.156  The 
factors that motivated the government to classify PAGAD as a vigilante organization that was 
using various methods including terrorism to achieve its goals and reasons for PAGAD’s decline 
will also be discussed. 
 
4.1 PAGAD’s Origins 
 
South Africa’s first multi-racial democratic elections were held in 1994.  That year, the new 
ANC democratic government made several promises which included improved housing, 
employment opportunities and a decrease in crime.  However, these promises were not kept.157  
After 1994, improved housing and employment opportunities were minimal and the crime rate 
continued to increase, especially in Western Cape where police figures revealed rises in 
                                                 
154 There is uncertainty concerning the year that PAGAD emerged in the Western Cape.  During the television 
program “Future Imperfect” in 1996, September 13th, Farouk Jaffar, PAGAD’s chief coordinator at the time, 
maintained that that PAGAD emerged in 1995.  However, in an interview conducted with a PAGAD member on the 
16th October 2008, it was said that PAGAD emerged in 1996.  In this paper, PAGAD is said to have emerged in the 
early part of 1996.         
 
155 When referring to the term “decline”, the word is not meant to signify that PAGAD has ceased to exist or that 
organization is inactive.  PAGAD is still active in Cape Town and its members hold meetings on a regular basis. 
They are involved in drug rehabilitation and counselling programmes which were previously established by PAGAD 
and they constantly hold public speeches about their cause and aims.   However, the manner in which PAGAD is 
operating at present differs significantly from how PAGAD operated from 1996 to 2000. 
 
156 The Mercury, 5th October 2001.   
 
157 K. Gottschalk, “Vigilantism v. The State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000,” Institute of 














gangsterism,158 drugs and crime.  This was a clear indication of ineffective state action to 
suppress the crime wave. 
 
In the Western Cape, as gangsterism intensified through various tactics involving bribery and 
extortion, so did crime.  For instance, between October 1994 and March 1995, the police 
recorded 253 gang-related murders in an area outside Cape Town, known as the Cape Flats. 159 
 
Additionally, since democratic South Africa was perceived as a large market for drugs (this was 
due to the country’s transport and communications infrastructure, its vulnerability and its corrupt 
officials), drug smuggling escalated and more drug laboratories160 were set up resulting in hard 
drugs like cocaine and Mandrax161 to be available in huge quantities on the South African market 
at affordable prices.162  Consequently, drug consumption doubled amongst the population.163 
 
                                                 
158 There are about 80,000 active gang members belonging to at least 137 gangs in Cape Town.  Gangsterism has 
always existed in the Western Cape especially as a result of marginalization.  However, in the Cape Flats, 
gangsterism has thrived mainly because they are able to “buy support” from corrupt and incompetent policemen and 
because, after 1994, the police and magistrate were in turmoil as a result of the transformation.  Basically, little 
effort has been made by the government to build police stations and extend police patrols, most of the police officers 
were former Bantustan “greenflies” and police who only had a primary schooling and were authoritarian to the 
public, ill trained and incompetent. 
 
159 K. Gottschalk, “Vigilantism v. The State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000,” Institute of 
Security Studies Papers, 99, (February 2005):  4. The Cape Flats is comprised of Mitchells Plain, Manenberg, 
Phillipi, Bishop Lavis, Bellville South and Elsies River. These districts are home to the province’s Coloured 
community. Coloureds constitute more than half of the Western Cape’s population and are predominantly Muslim.  
 
160 Only 10 percent of drugs entering South Africa are seized and, as a result of corrupt policemen and a lack of 
public cooperation, laboratories are now increasingly being established on farms, thus making them more difficult to 
find and destroy. 
 
161 The Cape Argus, 13th May 2007. Most crimes committed under the influence of Mandrax usually involve 
spontaneous and frenzied mutilation of the victim’s body. 
 
162 K. Gottschalk, “Vigilantism v. The State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000,” Institute of 
Security Studies Papers, 99, (February 2005):  5. 
 
163 Drug consumption in South Africa is segmented according to population group.  In Cape Town, Mandrax is more 
popular with Coloured drug-users than with drug-users from any other population group. Cannabis is popular among 














With more drugs on the market, crime, gangsterism and gang wars increased in communities in 
the Cape Flats where such occurrences were already rife.164  Residents in this community 
insisted that the government, the criminal justice system and law enforcement were not doing 
much to stop these criminal activities.165  Accordingly, in the Western Cape, community 
members mobilized and took “matters into their own hands”.166  In 1996, five individuals met to 
discuss the problem of gangsterism and drugs in their community.167  As one PAGAD member 
comments, “they [the individuals] knew that there was a drug problem...the five of them said ‘we 
need to do something about it’...that was the origins of PAGAD, in 1996”.168 
 
Up to this date, it is uncertain who these five individuals were.  However, sources claim that 
PAGAD’s former leader, Abdus Salaam Ebrahim was one of them.  Ebrahim was already part of 
Qibla and the Islamic Unity Convention (IUC)169 at that time and sources maintain that he and 
the other four individuals brought their concerns to the IUC before deciding to mobilize support 
for their cause by going to Mosques around Cape Town and talking about the seriousness of 
gangsterism and drugs in the Western Cape.170  Undoubtedly, more meetings followed with 
greater numbers of the community becoming involved.  Subsequently, a network of scattered 
civic movements and neighbourhood watches in the Coloured residential areas grew and then 
merged into an organization called People Against Gangsterism and Drugs.171  This is the 
conventional account of how PAGAD emerged. 
                                                 
164 S. Jeppie, “Introduction” in Drugs, Gangs, People’s Power: Exploring the PAGAD Phenomenon (Claremont: 
Masjid, 1996), 14. 
 
165 B. Harris, “‘As for Violent Crime that’s our Daily Bread’: Vigilante Violence during South Africa’s period of 
Transition”, Violence and Transition Series, 1 (2001): 34. 
 
166 R. Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet’: The Rise and fall of PAGAD”, Low Intensity Conflict and  Law 
Enforcement, 12, 1 (Spring 2004): 2. 
 
167 Taken from an interview of a PAGAD member conducted on the 16th October, 2008 by Katiana Ramsamy.   
 
168 Taken from an interview of a PAGAD member conducted on the 16th October, 2008 by Katiana Ramsamy.  
  
169 The IUC was formed early in 1994 to serve as an umbrella organization for more than 250 Muslim organizations.  
It also aimed to represent the Muslim population in South Africa. 
 
170Taken from an interview on the 28th October, 2008 by Katiana Ramsamy.  
 
171 R. Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet’: The Rise and fall of PAGAD”, Low Intensity Conflict and  Law 













Initially, PAGAD was a loose organization with an informal structure and style of leadership that 
consisted of no more than a dozen activists from small local groups.  PAGAD’s founding 
members were diverse in terms of their race, backgrounds and religious affiliations.172   While 
some came from Cape Town’s Muslim community, others came from other religious 
backgrounds.173  Nevertheless, despite their differences, the founding members understood that 
gangsterism and drugs were problems that affected the whole of South Africa and not just the 
Western Cape.  For them, “the drug problem was an extension of the dop system”.174  It was 
maintained that, like alcohol during Apartheid, drugs are extremely destructive and are used as a 
form of “payment” and to “undermine the masses” in South Africa.175 
 
PAGAD members also understood that drug-dealing, crime and gangsterism could not be 
countered by small isolated local organizations, individuals and families in the Coloured 
communities.176  Such attempts had proven to be ineffective to the point that community 
members had become indifferent and were co-existing with the same people who were 
destroying their communities.177  Hence, there was a need for all those who were against 
gangsterism and drugs to merge together and create a critical mass of popular support for action 
against the gangsters and drug lords and to isolate the criminals.  This is what happened when 
PAGAD first emerged.  The organization brought together local groups, families and individuals 
who did not want their communities destroyed by drugs, gangs and crime. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
172 S. Pillay, “Problematising the making of Good and Evil: Gangs and PAGAD,” Critical Arts, 16,2 (2002): 53-56. 
 
173 Ibid, 4. 
 
174 Taken from an interview of a PAGAD member conducted on the 16th October, 2008 by Katiana Ramsamy.   
During the Apartheid era, the dop or “tot system” was popular.  It refers to the situation when white-owned 
vineyards paid their black and mixed race employees in part with low-grade wine as an alternative to money.  
Presently, the dop system has left a legacy of alcohol dependence and abuse in South Africa and is closely linked to 
the country’s prevalence of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS). 
 
175 Taken from an interview of a PAGAD member conducted on the 16th October, 2008 by Katiana Ramsamy.   
 
176 B. Dixon and L. Johns, “Gangs, PAGAD and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape,” 
















PAGAD served as an anti-crime and an anti-drug front.  It co-operated with local communities, 
other anti-crime groups and the police.  Thus, it was an organic, grass-root community response 
to the problem of crime, drug-abuse and gangsterism in the Cape Flats.  Drugs and gangsterism 
were perceived as “core problems” that needed to be dealt with.  For many, PAGAD was a noble 
initiative that aimed to protect the affected community from criminal activities and drugs. 
 
4.1.1  Qibla 
 
PAGAD was not the first anti-crime structure in the Western Cape.  There were others such as 
the Salt River Co-ordinating Council (SRCC) against drug abuse and the “Peacemakers”.178  
PAGAD did not have any links with these organizations but there were claims that it did have 
ties with certain Muslim organizations like Qibla.  In fact, many maintained that Qibla was the 
driving force behind PAGAD’s violence and militancy and that the organization’s formation was 
directly linked to Qibla’s inability to develop into a mass-based organization for the promotion 
of militant Islamic fundamentalism. 
 
Qibla179 was formed in Cape Town in the late 1980s and was inspired by Iranian revolution in 
1979.180  Under the slogan, “One Solution, Islamic Revolution,” it sought to transform South 
Africa into a Muslim state and it opposed whatever was against Muslim values and ideals.181  
Hence, it was not surprising that Qibla rejected the new ANC-led government in South Africa 
because it emphasized on capitalism and “transformation” rather than the destruction of 
Apartheid.  Qibla played an active role during the anti-Apartheid struggle in the country.  The 
organization aligned itself with movements such as the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) 
and the PAC.182   
                                                 
178 Ibid, 2. 
 
179 Or the Qibla Mass Movement. 
 
180 The term Qibla originally refers to the direction of the Kaaba toward which Muslims turn for their daily prayers.   
 
181 Sindre Bangstad, “Hydra’s Heads: PAGAD and Responses to the PAGAD Phenomenon in a Cape Muslim 
Community,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 31, 1 (March 2005):  200-201. 
 














Since its formation, Qibla has been involved in several activities that highlight its extremist 
views, its fundamentalism and its open endorsement of violence to attain its goal.  Moreover, 
Qibla played a key role in the formation of the Western Cape based IUC183 and Radio 786.184  It 
was also perceived as the driving force behind PAGAD’s military wing, the G-Force (Gun 
Force)185 and its militancy.186 
 
Initially, Qibla had much support.  Today, its current membership is unknown and, although the 
organization was founded to be a mass movement, it never attained this goal.  By 1995, Qibla 
was experiencing growing dissatisfaction, especially from the younger members in its ranks who 
were demanding that Qibla returned to its militant Islamic Fundamentalist roots.187   
 
Qibla’s amir,188 Achmat Cassiem,189 was accused of leading the organization away from this 
fundamentalist objective.  It is for this reason that many people believe that Cassiem used 
PAGAD for Qibla’s own objectives and that PAGAD’s endorsement of violence was largely 
influenced by Qibla.190 
 
 
                                                 
183 The IUC also served as the opposition to the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC).  The MJC was established as an 
administrative organ for Sunni Muslims in Cape Town in 1945.  
 
184 Radio 786, like Qibla, was known for its militant views and support for Islamic Fundamentalism.  It was a key 
mobilizing tool for the IUC and Qibla in the province. 
  
185 The G-Force was comprised of small cell structures, well trained and armed and organized at a neighbourhood 
level.  It undertook covert actions against drug-dealers and gangsters.  
 
186 C. J. B. le Roux, “People Against Gangsterism and drugs (PAGAD),” Journal for Contemporary History, 22, 1 
(June 1997): 54. 
 
187 Ibid, 56. 
 
188 This means “commander”, both a spiritual and temporal sense. 
  
189 Cassiem was a veteran in the anti-Apartheid struggle.  He spent eleven years in prison and eleven years under 
banning orders due to his anti-Apartheid activities which included 24 counts of terrorism, membership of a banned 
organization, attempted murder and possession of arms and ammunition. Cassiem was influenced by the Iranian 
revolution in 1979.  It gave him a model for Qibla which was further developed based on the influence that he 
obtained by maintaining close relationships with militants in the PAC and the AZAPO in the 1990s. 
 
190 C. J. B. le Roux, “People Against Gangsterism and drugs (PAGAD),” Journal for Contemporary History, 22, 1 













4.1.2 PAGAD and Qibla 
 
In view of the above, there seems to be many facts reinforcing the notion that PAGAD and Qibla 
were closely linked with each other.  However, the main event linking the two organizations 
together was Rashaad Staggie’s murder on the 4th of August, 1996.191  Staggie was a drug-dealer 
who was killed by several PAGAD members in full view of civilians, the media and numerous 
police officers.192 
 
Staggie’s death had many implications for PAGAD and PAGAD’s relationship with Qibla.  For 
PAGAD, the incident marked a shift in the organization’s rhetoric and marked a change in the 
state’s perceptions of the organization.193  From being perceived as a just a “vigilante” 
organization by the state, PAGAD was then perceived as a vigilante organization that was using 
various methods including terrorism to achieve its objectives and was threatening the state’s 
monopoly on the use of coercive force as well as undermining the foundations of South Africa as 
a constitutional democracy.194 
 
Staggie’s death also reinforced the notion that PAGAD’s endorsement of violence was due to 
Qibla’s influence.  This notion was further reinforced when Cassiem attended and participated in 
PAGAD meetings and when he expressed his support for PAGAD the day after Staggie’s 
death.195   
 
In reality, PAGAD did emerge out of Qibla.  Historically, Qibla was an organization that had 
always used various means and “front” organizations to achieve its objectives such as 
                                                 
 




193 S. Bangstad, “Hydra’s Heads: PAGAD and Responses to the PAGAD Phenomenon in a Cape Muslim 
Community,” Journal of Southern African Studies, 31, 1 (March 2005):  199. 
 
194 B. Dixon and L. Johns, “Gangs, PAGAD and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape,” 
Violence and Transition Series, 2 (May 2001): 4. 
 
195 K. Gottschalk, “Vigilantism v. The State: A Case Study of the Rise and Fall of PAGAD, 1996-2000,” Institute of 














undermining the state.  As a marginalized organization in the Muslim community in the Western 
Cape, it could not do so alone.196  Hence, it used PAGAD, initially an anti-gang and anti-crime 
initiative.  In 1995, Qibla members introduced this initiative to its more respectable “front” 
organization, the IUC, which then presented it to the community, Muslim organizations and 
Mosques within the Cape Town area.197  It was only in 1996 that this anti-gang and anti-crime 
initiative became a public organization called “PAGAD”.  PAGAD first drew public attention to 
itself when it marched to Dullah Omar’s house but, even then, the march was referred as an 
“IUC march” as opposed to a “PAGAD march”.  It is fair to maintain that, through the IUC, 
Qibla was the driving force behind PAGAD’s establishment and it played a major role in 
PAGAD and greatly influenced the organization’s members especially concerning the use of 
violence.198 
 
Yet, despite the above arguments, there are others who maintain PAGAD and Qibla were not 
linked with each other.  This notion was reinforced when Cassiem denied the links between 
PAGAD and Qibla,199 when Qibla and the IUC publicly distanced themselves from PAGAD a 
few years after Staggie’s death and when Cassiem stopped attending PAGAD events.200  
However, Cassiem did maintain that the two organizations shared a common ground of opposing 
gangsterism and drugs and that there was possibility that Qibla’s ideologies were influential on 
certain PAGAD members.201  As one source suggested, “whatever Cassiem’s involvement with 
PAGAD are, he remains...the movement’s ideological father”.202   
                                                 
196 Taken from an interview conducted by Katiana Ramsamy on the 12th November, 2008. 
 
197 Taken from an interview conducted by Katiana Ramsamy on the 12th November, 2008. 
 
198 R. Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet’: The Rise and fall of PAGAD,” Low Intensity Conflict and  Law 
Enforcement, 12, 1 (Spring 2004): 5. 
 
199 It is important to note that, historically, “deniability” was a common tactic used by Qibla.  Qibla would distance 
itself from its front organization and, with regards to PAGAD, this is what also occurred.    
 
200 Sources claim that Cassiem and Qibla distanced itself from PAGAD as a result of the tensions that existed 
between Cassiem and Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, PAGAD’s recent leader and a member of Qibla and the IUC.  
 
201 F. Esack, “PAGAD: Its Location in the New South Africa” In Drugs, Gangs, People’s Power: Exploring the 
PAGAD Phenomenon, (Claremont: Masjid, 1996), 24-25. 
 














PAGAD also denied having links with Qibla.  As PAGAD’s spokesperson indicated, “people 
will work with any organization which has the same aims and objectives as us.  It wasn’t because 
of Qibla’s involvement that there was incitement of people. Qibla had no bearing on the 
decisions of PAGAD”.203  In other words, even though some Qibla members were part of  
PAGAD, the latter already had members who endorsed violence when it first emerged.  Hence, 
PAGAD members had a predisposition to act with violence regardless of whether it was taken 
over by Qibla or not.   
 
PAGAD’s violent tactics can also be attributed to the government’s ineffectiveness in handling 
the situation at hand and the violence used by drug-dealers towards PAGAD members.204  Thus, 
it is assumed that PAGAD members decided to tackle “violence with violence”.  However, to 
maintain that PAGAD started out using “peaceful means” to achieve its aims and then changed 
and began using violence as a result of Qibla’s influence is incorrect.  As will be discussed later, 
PAGAD used both peaceful and violent means to attain its goals from the time it emerged. 
 
There is also the argument that Qibla members only had a minority status with PAGAD because 
they mainly constituted PAGAD’s G-Force.205  Additionally, there is the assumption that the link 
between Qibla and PAGAD only became more evident when the Qibla “radical” faction 
neutralized the “moderate” faction in PAGAD and “took over” PAGAD’s leadership.  This 
notion implies that Qibla infiltrated PAGAD and then took control over organization.  However, 
to reiterate, Qibla did not infiltrate PAGAD because Qibla members were also part of PAGAD 
from the beginning.  Nevertheless, despite this and the arguments above, it was widely believed 
that PAGAD was fully controlled by Qibla, a notion propagated by the media and used to explain 
the reason for the supposed internal division and the expulsion of PAGAD leaders that took place 
in 1996. 
                                                 
 
203Interview conducted by Ashwin Desai in 2003.   
 
204 B. Dixon and L. Johns, “Gangs, PAGAD and the State: Vigilantism and Revenge Violence in the Western Cape,” 
Violence and Transition Series, 2 (May 2001): 27. 
 
205 R. Monaghan, “‘One Merchant, One Bullet’: The Rise and fall of PAGAD,” Low Intensity Conflict and  Law 














4.2 PAGAD Divided 
 
From the time PAGAD was established, there were obvious discordant voices within its 
leadership.  One day PAGAD was “willing to die tonight” for the “One Solution, Islamic 
Revolution” while, the next day, PAGAD was “sensible, ordinary community people who are fed 
up with drugs” and who maintained that the notion of an Islamic state was “laughable”.206  These 
claims reflected the tension and disunity that existed within PAGAD, especially in terms of its 
leadership.  For instance, while some PAGAD leaders and members advocated violence, others 
did not. While some leaders and members had a relationship and a long standing commitment to 
Qibla and the IUC, others did not.  Thus, like any other organization, PAGAD had disparate 
groups with several and often conflicting perspectives, especially at the leadership level.  
Eventually, these perceived conflicting perspectives were used to explain the “split” that 
supposedly took place within PAGAD in 1996. 
 
To reiterate, the perception held by the state apparatus, the media and the public was that 
PAGAD consisted of a “moderate” and a “radical” faction.  While the “moderate” faction was 
led by Nadthmie Edries,207 Farouk Jaffer208  and Muhammed Ali ‘Phantom’ Parker209 (they 
formed part of PAGAD’s early leadership210) and supposedly encompassed the majority of 
PAGAD members who rejected violence and sought to co-operate with the police in crime 
prevention functions, the “radical” faction, under the leadership of Abdus Salaam Ebrahim, 
supposedly advocated violence and consisted of Qibla members.211  By late 1996, both factions 
were supposedly battling with each other, especially on the issue regarding the use of violence 
when dealing with gangsterism and drug-dealers.  While this clearly indicated that certain 
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PAGAD members did not advocate violence, this also showed a measure of hypocrisy on behalf 
of PAGAD’s “moderate” leadership,212 especially since Parker had previously called for a jihad 
against gangsters and drug-dealers after Staggie’s death.213  
 
Parker, Jaffer and Edries also maintained that, while PAGAD’s vision for fighting crime and 
drugs was judicious and intended to re-establish community values, Qibla within PAGAD had an 
anti-state agenda instead.214  It is statements such as these that supposedly resulted in Parker, 
Jaffer and Edries being in power struggle with the militant and political extremist Qibla members 
within PAGAD.  Also, Parker had made unauthorized trips around the world and issued 
statements to the media without consulting fellow PAGAD members.215  This led to tensions and 
resentment as it was felt that the triumvirate had started to promote themselves as being more 
important than PAGAD and its aims.216   Hence, PAGAD expelled the triumvirate.  This 
supposedly “neutralized” the “moderate” faction of the PAGAD leadership corps and enhanced 
the control of the “radical” faction.  It was also said to have been a major factor that led to the 
supposed broader split within the organization in 1996.217 
 
It is important to note that the “split” within PAGAD in 1996 was viewed differently by the state, 
the media and PAGAD.  PAGAD members denied the existence of a “moderate faction” and 
“radical faction” within PAGAD and maintained that they were labels created by the state and 
the media to explain PAGAD’s “decline” and militarization.218  The expulsion of the triumvirate 
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believer to serve the Islamic faith and to defend it.  However, presently, jihad has been used to denote religious war. 
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was due to their misdeeds and their lack of leadership skills and was not a matter of “the radical 
faction versus the moderate faction” as such factions did not exist.219  Hence, a “spilt” in 1996 
did not occur.   
 
For the state and the media, the “split” was a defining factor in PAGAD’s decline since cohesion 
and unity is vital for any organization to survive.  In other words, the “split” was used to 
illustrate that PAGAD was defeated by its own internal disunity and brought PAGAD into 
conflict with the state.  Between 1996 and 2000, PAGAD engaged in terrorism which included 
acts such as assassinations and bombings.  As it portrayed itself as a grass-roots movement with 
distinct Islamist objectives, PAGAD’s acts were said to have been the consequences of the 
radical faction overpowering the moderate faction within PAGAD after the split.220  
 
4.3 PAGAD’s Strategies 
 
4.3.1 PAGAD’s first year of Operation (1995-1996) 
 
During the first year of PAGAD’s operation, the organization’s strategy was to voice its 
opposition against drug-dealers and gangsters across the Cape Flats.  Accordingly, PAGAD 
staged 112 protest marches even though its structure and leadership was rudimentary and 
informal.221  PAGAD did not have any political agenda beyond the elimination of gangsterism 
and drugs.  Hence, it was viewed as a vigilante group that had noble aims.  Even the ruling 
government decided to work with PAGAD and entered into consultation with it in 1997.  In that 
year, meetings were held between the PAGAD’s leaders and the Ministers of Justice, Safety and 
Security and Correctional Services, the Western Cape Attorney-General and Premier, magistrates 
and the police (this was done to discuss the possibility of cooperation between PAGAD and the 
SAPS).222  However, these meetings were organized only after PAGAD had sent several 
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memorandums to the Minister of Justice stating PAGAD’s dissatisfaction with the government 
and the manner in which it was handling the problem of drugs and gangsterism.223 
 
After these meetings, PAGAD eventually received quiet support from the government because of 
its ability to “crack down” on drug-dealers better than police.  However, this cooperation was 
short-lived and the meetings that followed were not fruitful.224  PAGAD members insisted on 
wearing masks and carrying guns during their marches and, on the government side, there was 
apprehension in terms of cooperating with PAGAD, especially when Staggie was murdered.225  
Staggie’s death symbolized the violence that posed a threat to South Africa’s democracy and, 
while the world and South Africa were concerned with this issue, PAGAD was concerned with 
other defining events such as its internal division,226 the breakdown in negotiations with Dullah 
Omar, the negative media coverage that the organization was receiving, the government’s failure 
to respond to PAGAD’s repeated requests for action to be taken against drugs and gangsterism 
and the shooting of a PAGAD marcher (Faizel Ryklief) by gangsters.227 
 
4.3.2 PAGAD begins to Mature (1996-1997) 
 
After the expulsion of the triumvirate, it seemed as though the organization took on a more 
militant image and stance.  However, this was not related to the expulsion of the triumvirate or to 
the “radical” faction taking over the leadership.  It had to do with the ineffectiveness of 
PAGAD’s non-violent tactics against the gangsters228 and drug-dealers who were using violence 
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against PAGAD members.  PAGAD then changed its strategy.  Some members began carrying 
weapons and wearing balaclavas229 and some drifted into the G-Force.230 
 
Pressure from the state, the police and the media also affected PAGAD’s outlook during that 
time.  Since PAGAD was constantly demonized and criticized by the media, the police and the 
government, it was realized that help from the state or the police was unlikely. At this point in 
time PAGAD decided that matters had to be taken into their own hands. 
 
There are many reasons why PAGAD’s relationship with the police, the media, and the state 
deteriorated.  For the police, the relationship deteriorated when PAGAD began using violence to 
achieve its goals, when it publicly accused police officials of corruption and when PAGAD-
incited violence began taking the form of urban terrorism.231  Then, the acting National 
Commissioner, Zolissa Lavisa, claimed “as far as the SAPS is concerned, PAGAD has 
degenerated into just another gang, and is now firmly part of the crime problem and not the 
solution”.232  The police labelled PAGAD as “terrorists” thus allowing the police to impact on 
the organization’s mass mobilization against gangsters and drug-dealers and forcing PAGAD to 
fight “defensive battles” in courts and to go through formal procedures in order to be able to 
march.233  In other words, the police ensured that PAGAD’s crucial “weapons” of surprise and 
spontaneity were removed. It was clear that PAGAD had underestimated the state’s power to 
criminalize them.234 
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Regarding the media, it also consciously and unconsciously colluded with PAGAD’s strategy by 
giving extensive coverage to some of the organization’s actions.235  However, it generally 
portrayed PAGAD in a negative light and in a “more extreme picture than the reality prevailing 
on the ground”.236  The media rarely publicized the positive acts of PAGAD to counter drugs.237 
 
With regards to the government, not only was it unwilling to cooperate with PAGAD, there was 
also an obvious mutual distrust and suspicion that existed between the two.  This became quite 
evident when the police were arresting PAGAD members and raiding their homes238 at the same 
time while PAGAD members were protesting against drug trafficking outside the Airport and 
while they were a marching to the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR).239 
 
4.3.3 PAGAD’s Terror Years (1997-2000) 
 
The period 1997 to 2000 are usually referred to as PAGAD’s terror years because PAGAD 
carried out acts that were coercive, shocking and intimidating and which caused fear and panic 
amongst the population.240  PAGAD was able to use terrorism for several reasons. However, the 
main reason was that democratic South Africa provided PAGAD with a permissive environment 
to use terrorism.  Between October 1997 and January 1998, PAGAD killed 24 drug-dealers, was 
involved in 195 attacks against alleged drug-dealers and their property and was linked to 188 out 
of the 667 violent attacks recorded in Cape Town during that time.241 
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From 1998 onwards, though the number of PAGAD marches had dropped significantly, its use 
of terrorism intensified. Drug-dealers and gangsters were still targeted as well as academics, 
Muslims, non-Muslims and clerics critical of the tactics employed by PAGAD and the G-
Force.242   For instance, after criticizing PAGAD, Dr Ebrahim Moosa, an academic at the 
University of Cape Town, was denounced as a munafiq243 and targeted by PAGAD.244  Even the 
provincial ANC chairperson, Ebrahim Rasool, and Sheikh Achmat Sedick, the Secretary-General 
of the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) were targeted because they opposed PAGAD’s 
viewpoints.245   
 
PAGAD was also accused of assassinating prominent individuals such as Piet Theron (the 
magistrate who had been hearing cases involving PAGAD members) and witnesses due to give 
evidence in the court cases against PAGAD members.246 
Also, PAGAD murdered its own members (“organizational terrorism”)247 and targeted the 
police, the court and the media.  While PAGAD maintained that the police were conspiring with 
the drug-dealers and gangs, it also accused the courts of releasing them on easy bail terms.   
 
Concerning the media, PAGAD threatened the staff of several news agencies with death threats 
and boycotts.  PAGAD had threatened to kill the Muslim photojournalist Benny Gool who was a 
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witness to Staggie’s murder.248  Gool even refused to testify against five senior PAGAD 
members249 accused of the murder. 
 
From 1999 to 2000, there was a decline in the bombing and shooting incidents carried out by 
PAGAD.  However, their activities became more indiscriminate and unpredictable, a common 
trend amongst declining organizations that use terrorism.  Once such organizations lose power, 
their behaviour worsens and becomes more erratic.  This in turn, allows for more terrorism to 
occur.250  Hence, this is the reason why public places and places of entertainment in Cape Town 
were being targeted instead of drug-dealers and gangsters.251  More specifically, personnel and 
facilities of the state’s security and intelligence services, gay bars as well as business linked to 
the US were targets.252  
 
PAGAD denied its involvement and condemned the incidents outlined above.253  Nevertheless, 
by the end of 2000, 26 PAGAD members and 117 gunmen had been arrested, prosecuted and 
charged with a range of offences including sedition, murder, attempted murder, possession of 
illegal firearms, malicious damage to property and public violence.254  For the state, PAGAD had 
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committed “clear acts of treason” through their acts of terrorism and illegal possession of 
weapons and those who were arrested had to answer to the charges against them.255 
 
Those who were arrested were prominent figures in PAGAD (they included those in the 
leadership ranks and those who were not leaders but were instrumental in terms of PAGAD’s 
organization and survival such as G-Force leaders and members).  The evidence that was used 
against them was given to the investigating agencies by fellow PAGAD members.  This was a 
deliberate action on the part of the state which allowed it to exploit and further reinforce 
PAGAD’s internal disunity, thus crippling the organization more. 
 
Overall, PAGAD was a vigilante organization that used terrorism among other methods to 
achieve its broadened aims (this included the destruction of capitalism and democracy).  There 
are many reasons why PAGAD used terrorism.  For instance, the freedoms allowed in 
democratic South Africa made it easy for PAGAD to engage in terrorism.  However, PAGAD 
also acted as a community pressure group while at the same time forming and activating its 
covert military wing.256  Nevertheless, by 2001, PAGAD’s covert activities came to a standstill 
with the arrest and prosecution of its prominent leaders257 and crucial members such as G-Force 
leaders.258  The state’s decision to arrest these individuals was a factor in the organization’s 
decline.  Without any form of leadership and without anyone to direct PAGAD’s violent 
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4.4 PAGAD’s Support 
 
Like PAGAD’s internal disunity, PAGAD’s loss of support was also a cause of PAGAD’s self-
destruction.  Initially, by embarking on an intensive awareness campaign and drawing attention 
to its aims, PAGAD was able to attract between 2000 and 5000 supporters to its protest marches 
and rallies.259  As its support grew, PAGAD’s meetings, protests and rallies attracted 10,000 to 
40,000 people that came from both the middle- and working-class.260 
 
PAGAD’s support initially came in two forms, passive and active. While active support entailed 
direct involvement in PAGAD‘s activities, passive support was “in-principle support” without 
physical action.  PAGAD was able to generate much support because, first, it was able to 
sensitize the international arena on the increasing crime situation in South Africa and the 
government’s inability to deal with the situation.261  Second, many Muslims as saw it as a new 
progressive organization262 and third, its aims were peaceful, benevolent and many shared its 
goals.  Marches were organized and “ultimatums” were given to the government demanding 
state-action against drug-dealers and gangsters.  When the government did not act, PAGAD 
members marched to the homes of alleged drug-dealers and gangsters and gave them a 24-hour 
warning or ultimatum to end their drug dealings and gang-related crimes.263  
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Once PAGAD became more violent, attendance at its events declined sharply.264  Some 
supporters did not endorse the organization’s use of violence to carry out its “new goals”.  For 
instance, a former PAGAD supporter maintained that “they [PAGAD] stood for good things. But 
you cannot kill persons...PAGAD’s actions are contrary to Islam and reflects badly on the 
oemma [community]”.265  Negative media reports also contributed to PAGAD’s loss of 
support.266 
 
While PAGAD lost most of its support as a result of its violent methods,267  the organization also 
lost support due to factors outside of its control.  These included the threat of revenge attacks by 
gangsters and state repression.  For instance, when the government invoked the Prohibition of 
Disguises Act of 1969, PAGAD members became “easy targets” for the police, the drug-dealers 
and the gangsters.  Hence, PAGAD members and supporters became afraid and refrained from 
supporting the organization.  Moreover, when the government restricted PAGAD’s marches and 
banned the open carrying of firearms, PAGAD lost support and could not operate as it used to. 
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4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
PAGAD emerged as a result of the failure of the democratic government to suppress 
gangsterism, crime and drugs, especially in Western Cape.  It started as just a “vigilante” 
organization with very good intentions and, as a result, had strong support.  However, when 
PAGAD started to get frustrated with the inaction of the authorities against drug-dealers and 
criminals and, with the freedom in democratic South Africa, it took the law in its own hands and 
began using terrorism.  Thus, PAGAD was perceived as a vigilante organization that was using 
various methods including terrorism to achieve its objectives.  Its relationship with the 
government and the police deteriorated and its mass support dwindled as it engaged in terrorism 
supposedly conducted by its radical wing. This caused internal disunity which led to its own 
demise. 
 
Other factors which led to PAGAD’s decline included the government’s use of the “criminal 
justice system” to clamp down on its prominent leaders and crucial members, the betrayal and 
mistrust that existed between PAGAD members, the costly caring of the families of the arrested 
members and the lack of funding.268  However these factors were minimal in comparison to the 
fact that PAGAD was the cause of its own demise. 
 
Additional factors that have been overlooked in terms of PAGAD’s decline include the in-
fighting amongst the gangs and the loss of support because PAGAD had attacked the MJC.  Due 
to the fact that the MJC is a very influential Muslim organization in the Western Cape, attacking 
the MJC was a mistake and once the MJC condemned PAGAD, others did the same.269   
 
Nevertheless, despite these issues and despite the fact that PAGAD was misguided, PAGAD was 
active for 5 years in South Africa, greatly challenging the state.  The state began to perceive 
PAGAD as a terrorist group which challenged and threatened the country’s security and its 
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constitutional liberties and freedoms.270  Hence, the South African government responded to 
PAGAD in a very determined way. 
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SOUTH AFRICA’S RESPONSE TO PAGAD 
 
To respond to terrorism by PAGAD, the South African government employed several strategies 
categorized as political strategies and intelligence-led policing operations.  In this chapter, these 
strategies and the responses to PAGAD will be analyzed.  It is important to note that any 
response to PAGAD had to be within the confines of the Constitution.  Accordingly, the 
“criminal justice model” would be the best approach. It is further assumed that it was the 
government’s response that played a key role in the decline of PAGAD.   
 
5.1 The National and the Western Cape Response to PAGAD 
 
5.1.1 The National Response to PAGAD 
 
When PAGAD first emerged, the response of the national government was “confused”271 
showing its uncertainty and unpreparedness to deal with the situation even though it was well 
aware of the possibility of terrorist threats after 1994.  This “confusion” led to the government 
seeking to negotiate with PAGAD on several occasions,272 a decision that has been commonly 
made by many democracies in the past to isolate terrorists and satisfy their demands273 in the 
hope they can wither away.274   
 
There are several reasons why the government was reluctant to classify PAGAD as a terrorist 
threat even though it was involved in violent incidents at the end of 1996.275   First, the 
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government saw PAGAD’s acts of violence as crimes rather than terrorist acts.276  Second, 
policy-makers found themselves in a dilemma because they could not reconcile the fact that 
terrorism could be effectively dealt with in a severe manner and within the context of a human 
rights environment. Classifying and responding to PAGAD as a vigilante organization that used 
terrorism would mean using anti-terrorism policies and methods that closely resembled those 
used during Apartheid.277 Third, the government was reluctant to label PAGAD as a terrorist 
threat as it emerged at a time when South Africa was going through a transformation and when 
the US was claiming that their national security was being threatened by “Islamic militants” and 
“Islamic fundamentalists”.278  The South African government did not want to be part of the 
global anti-Islamist movement and to adopt the same drastic anti-terror policies and methods as 
the US.279  By reacting like the US, the South African government was aware that it could 
possibly worsen the situation with PAGAD.280  
 
In general, when PAGAD first emerged, the government’s “confusion” and its inability to 
categorize PAGAD as a terrorist threat led to inaction.  Consequently, the government could not 
deal effectively with the organization.  Even as a just vigilante organization, PAGAD had 
committed several acts of violence that the government was unable to effectively quell.  One can 
therefore assume that the first phase of the response to PAGAD was that of “under-reaction”.  It 
is this “under-reaction” and South Africa’s freedoms that allowed PAGAD to diversify its tactics 
at the beginning of 1997.  The organization took advantage of the government’s lack of response 
and incompetence to use terrorism to achieve its broadened goals.281  One can also assume that, 
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if the government had been more aggressive towards PAGAD when it first emerged, PAGAD 
would not have been able to operate as well as it did.   
 
It was only when PAGAD became very violent and was recognized as an Islamist-inspired 
terrorist group that the national response became more aggressive. The question, however, was 
how to deal with such an organization as there were different approaches that could be 
utilized.282  Finally, the government decided to use the “criminal justice system” to respond to 
PAGAD.283  This was the second phase of the national response to PAGAD which was based on 
the use of law enforcement.284  However, the responses during late 1997 and 1998 were 
incoherent.285  For instance, in 1998, several political strategies and intelligence-led policing 
operations such as Recoil and Saladin were launched, but were largely futile and ineffective as 
PAGAD continued to operate and commit more terrorist acts.286 
 
The government developed a more coherent political and law enforcement response to PAGAD 
only in 1999.  That year, police had over 600 cases of terrorism which were not solved.  Even 
though the police was able to distinguish between “gang-related” cases and “PAGAD-related” 
cases, there were no convictions from either category.287  Hence, “a lot of political manoeuvering 
[was] taking place [that were combined] with improved intelligence and improved law 
enforcement especially in 1999/2000.  That was the most decisive phase in defeating 
PAGAD”.288 
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283 To reiterate, the criminal justice model views terrorism as a crime and the onus of response is placed with the 
bounds of the state’s criminal legal system.   
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Overall, there was confusion and under-reaction when PAGAD first emerged as the government 
was unsure of what type of organization it was.  It is quite understandable that the initial 
response to PAGAD was confused as this was the first time that democratic South Africa had to 
deal with such a situation. By 1998, however, this confusion had dissipated because PAGAD 
was finally classified as a terrorist threat.289 However, the measures which constituted the 
government’s second response to PAGAD290 were incoherent and ineffective.  By 1999 the 
government had developed a more coherent political and law enforcement response to PAGAD.  
This was the final response at the national level, thus suggesting that it took the government at 
least two years to come to grips with the situation and assert itself as the authority. 
 
5.1.2 The Western Cape Response to PAGAD 
 
As a Western Cape-based organization, the provincial response to PAGAD differed from the 
national response.  When PAGAD first emerged, as opposed to responding decisively, 
accusations occurred especially between the ANC and the Western Cape provincial leaders (the 
NNP (New National Party) and the Democratic Party (DP)).291  While the ANC was accusing the 
provincial leaders for not adequately tackling the issue of vigilantism and acting decisively in the 
province, the NNP and the DP were claiming that PAGAD was a ploy devised by the ANC to 
undermine the Western Cape’s leadership and to destabilize the province that did not vote for the 
ANC.292 
 
The notion that the ANC was using PAGAD as a ploy to destabilize the Western Cape293 was a 
perception held by many, especially the police,294 but when Staggie was murdered, the Western 
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Cape government then realized that the ANC was not involved in any destabilization ploy.  It 
was then forced to act against PAGAD with the help of the national government.  This further 
reinforced the fact that the national government was not using PAGAD to destabilize the 
provincial government.   
 
The provincial government realized that PAGAD was a serious terrorist threat to the province 
and, acting under this immense pressure combined with the media attention that Staggie’s 
murder attracted, the provincial leaders had no option but to act decisively and swiftly.  Similar 
to the national response, the Western Cape leadership also decided that PAGAD was to be 
handled as a law enforcement problem. 
 
From 1997 to 2000, several provincial intelligence-led policing operations were launched, but 
were not combined with political strategies to undermine the organization.295  The provincial 
policing operations were supported by national operations but the national government expected 
the provincial government to deal with the organization in accordance with the existing legal 
framework. 
 
Overall, the Western Cape’s response to PAGAD was similar to the national response. Initially, 
the Western Cape leaders did not act decisively against PAGAD because the Western Cape 
provincial leaders were convinced that the ANC was using PAGAD as a ploy to destabilize the 
province.  However, Staggie’s murder triggered the development and execution of a series of 
intelligence-led operations against PAGAD.  The provincial leaders had finally realized that 
PAGAD was a threat to the stability of the province and was a law enforcement problem. 
 
5.2 Responding to PAGAD: South Africa’s Strategies 
The strategies used to respond to PAGAD can be categorized as political strategies and 
intelligence-led policing strategies.  While the former refers to the political means that were used 
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to undermine PAGAD, the latter refers to the use of the “criminal justice method” to respond to 
PAGAD.  The SAPS, with the aid of other agencies, had the authority to pursue PAGAD 
members and arrest them.  PAGAD members were then prosecuted and sentenced according to 
South Africa’s existing security legislation. 
5.2.1 Political Strategies 
 
The national government executed many political strategies to prevent PAGAD from acquiring 
legitimacy and support, the important elements that enable organizations that use terrorism to 
thrive and survive.  Once such organizations are delegitimized and their support is reduced, they 
find it more difficult to mobilize resources and operate effectively.  Hence, considerable efforts 
were deployed to deny PAGAD political, economic and religious space.296  The denial of 
political space involved organizing anti-PAGAD marches and leaflets and the encouragement on 
behalf of the ANC for political parties to speak out against PAGAD and vigilantism.297  The 
denial of economic space involved the national leaders approaching the Muslim Community (this 
is where most of PAGAD’s supporters derived from) and petitioning and urging potential donors 
not to support PAGAD financially.298 
 
ANC leaders also approached and petitioned at least 50 imams within the Cape Town area to 
condemn PAGAD’s attitude and actions, especially its abuse of mosques, its aggressiveness 
towards imams, sheikhs and other religious leaders.299  For instance, former president Nelson 
Mandela delivered a speech at the Claremont mosque asking the community members to be 
weary of PAGAD.  The speech was broadcasted simultaneously on a Friday in all Cape Town 
mosques and was delivered in the name of the MJC.300 
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To further prevent PAGAD from acquiring legitimacy and support, it was denied media and 
“criminal” space.  The media was urged to refrain from offering sympathy to PAGAD and from 
legitimizing vigilantism as a response to crime. Senior prosecutors and police officers were 
sensitized on the urgency of arresting and convicting PAGAD members involved in the 
numerous bombings and assassinations.  However, this action was not without difficulties.  In 
pursuing PAGAD members, rookie detectives had to learn on the job from their more 
experienced colleagues who worked under the Apartheid regime.301 Consequently, tensions 
occurred between the old guard policemen and new policemen from MK backgrounds.  
Moreover, the state had to deal with the fact that the detectives involved in the pursuance of 
PAGAD members were mostly familiar with the “confession-based procedure,” a process not 
allowed within the confines of a democratic state as it entailed torturing and assaulting suspects 
(especially to obtain information).302   Thus, they had to be retrained and learn the modern, 
forensic-science-based procedures aimed at attaining material evidence.  The internal conflicts 
and corruption within the police were indeed great challenges which the authorities faced in their 
fight against PAGAD.303 
 
Overall, the political strategies employed by the national government to undermine PAGAD 
mainly involved isolating PAGAD from its potential and financial supporters by destroying the 
organization’s legitimacy.  Delegitimizing PAGAD was done in several ways.  However, the 
determining factor was the denouncing of PAGAD’s actions by the MJC.  By appealing to the 
MJC and reinforcing a greater schism between PAGAD and the MJC, the government was aware 
that PAGAD would have problems in terms of gaining support and funding. This would 
eventually cripple PAGAD and prevent the organization from effectively operating.  This clearly 
indicates that the political strategists had studied the organizational structure of PAGAD as well 
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as its sources of finance, which provided the government with the correct strategies to cripple 
PAGAD.304 
 
5.2.2  Intelligence-led Policing Strategies 
 
After Staggie’s death, the government decided to “get tough” with PAGAD.  In order to respond 
to the organization, policing operations were conducted.  For instance, the SAPS and the 
SANDF305 collaborated together, through the Provincial Operational Coordinating Committee 
(POCOC), and conducted a “high density” operation which entailed SAPS and SANDF members 
flooding specific areas that were associated with PAGAD members, executing patrols, 
roadblocks, cordons and search operations.  However, once the acts of terrorism committed by 
PAGAD members took on larger proportions,306 government officials and police agencies 
decided normal police action was ineffective.  To respond to PAGAD, the SAPS and the SANDF 
jointly responded through the National Operational Coordinating Committee (NOCOC)307 to 
execute special intelligence-led policing operations.308  In these operations “[there was] the 
involvement of the military in support of the police to combating PAGAD [in] setting up road-
blocks, searching houses, premises, those types of things…these are what they call intelligence-
led operations”.309  They were more targeted and focused than the normal policing operations 
 
                                                 
304 Ibid. 
 
305 The SANDF had a limited role in helping the SAPS counter PAGAD. 
 
306 This refers to the fact that PAGAD’s targets were no longer limited to gangsters and drug-deals but also to those 
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The intelligence-led policing operations that were launched were Operations Recoil, Saladin, 
Good Hope, Crackdown and Lancer.310  Their main goal was to identify certain PAGAD 
members, the locations where PAGAD’s terror acts would be taking place and the locations for 
their meetings.311 
 
Operation Recoil had four components: an intelligence-driven factor; a high-density crime 
prevention factor; investigating task groups and coordination and visible force levels.312  It was 
launched in the face of mounting displeasure of the population against gangsterism and crime as 
well as the loss of faith in the government due to its inability to deal effectively with PAGAD’s 
unlawful activities.  The operation’s main aim was to flush out criminals, identify certain 
PAGAD members, their potential targets and their location for their meetings.313 
 
Though successful to a certain extent, Operation Recoil could not contain PAGAD and prevent 
the organization from gaining momentum.  Instead, it “compelled PAGAD to be more creative in 
how it organized”.314  By arresting 7,437 individuals, Operation Recoil showed that all the 
policing operations in the Western Cape were performed under its banner and that “we [the 
government, the police and the army] are everywhere…instilling confidence in the minds of the 
public-that the government is doing something”.315  Basically, Operation Recoil was primarily 
launched “to create an impression” as opposed to actually responding to PAGAD and crippling 
it.316  In fact, the need to “create an impression” in the minds of the people can be understood 
due to the fact that when the operation was launched, the government still perceived PAGAD as 
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a vigilante organization and not a vigilante organization that was using terrorism.317  Operation 
Recoil was rather ineffective and could not control PAGAD’s diversified actions.318  As a result, 
a more intelligence-driven policing operation named Operation Saladin was conceptualized 
within the framework of Operation Recoil and launched in January1998. 
 
Operation Saladin involved both operational and intelligence members from the SAPS, the 
SANDF and the NIA.319  It was established to detect and monitor the perpetrators of acts of 
urban terrorism by both PAGAD and the gangs, to provide early warnings of attacks and to 
ensure that visible policing took place.  Operation Saladin also ensured the effective interception 
of perpetrators of acts of terrorism both before and after attacks, it deployed high-density forces 
in the proximity of the intended targets and it acted as an additional deterrent to would-be 
perpetrators.  Consequently, PAGAD members and the gangs were denied the opportunity of 
going about their illegal activity.320 
Like Operation Recoil, Operation Saladin was successful to a certain degree.  It acted as a 
deterrent to prevent acts of urban terrorism and gang-related violence and it led to the arrest of 
people involved in acts of terrorism.321  However, like Operation Recoil, Operation Saladin was 
also not well-equipped to deal with the changing nature of the threats from PAGAD.  By 
December 1998, PAGAD was targeting gangsters, drug-dealers, fellow PAGAD members, 
individuals critical of PAGAD as well members of both the security and intelligence forces and 
businesses (this showed the increasing selectivity of the perpetrators of the terrorist acts).  As a 
result, there was a shift in emphasis by the security forces that entailed combining operations 
Recoil and Saladin into one operation, Operation Good Hope.322 
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Operation Good Hope, launched in January 1999, was characterized by an increase in security 
force levels that were extended to include more than 1,200 members inclusive of SAPS and 
SANDF members.323  It excluded the local police station in Cape Town and focused on 
stabilizing operations regarding urban terrorism, tactical intervention regarding urban terrorism 
and crowd management and high-risk operations regarding urban terrorism.  It encompassed 
intelligence-driven operations in specifically focused areas and it entailed the investigation and 
protection of specific targets.324 
Moreover, unlike the previous operation that focused on crime-prevention, Operation Good 
Hope focused on prohibiting urban terrorism.  Hence, tactical intelligence gathering and 
dedicated court-directed intelligence gathering were its major components.  This strategy, 
combined with searches and patrols, resulted in the arrests of individuals involved in urban 
terrorism in the Western Cape and the subsequent decline of such acts and gang-related violence 
in the area.325  In addition, the strategies used in Operation Good Hope also resulted in the 
recovery of firearms, vehicles and ammunitions. 
 
Even though Operation Good Hope could not prevent the increase in gang-related violence in 
early 2000,326 that year PAGAD-related incidents were the lowest.327  Only 15 arrests were made 
and some 22 incidents occurred thus suggesting that the state’s response to curb urban terrorism 
was successful.328  Nevertheless, despite these positive figures, Operation Good Hope did have 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
323 Ibid.   
 
324 By 1999, PAGAD-related incidents had taken a new dimension in the sense that use of petrol and pipe bombs 
had increased.  To name a few incidents, in 1998, four youths had been murdered at the Waterfront, several pipe and 
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325 Operation Good Hope can be perceived as a preventive approach that emphasized on an integrated method used 
by the security forces. 
 
326 There were 437 incidents of gang violence in which only 160 people were arrested. 
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its problems.  There were difficulties in terms of the coordination of tactical intelligence between 
the role players as well as those of the investigation units.  Moreover, Operation Good Hope was 
restructured in November 1999 and had to work with the Scorpions, the elite “police” unit that 
took over the investigation of urban terror and organized crime in the Western Cape.329  The 
Scorpions were brought into the picture to coordinate the activities of the various operations 
which, if not managed properly, could be counter productive. 
Nevertheless, despite these changes, PAGAD-related incidents still occurred which clearly 
indicated that the government had not yet crippled the organization.  For instance, investigators 
were assassinated, plans for a pre-election bombing campaign by PAGAD were discovered330 
and bombs were detonated in various places in Cape Town.  Due to these incidents, Operation 
Crackdown was launched in April 2000.331 
Operation Crackdown was a “multi-disciplinary” strategy that was carried out in collaboration 
with high-density, intelligence-driven operations in the identified crime-combating zone.  This 
strategy consisted of two main approaches: the serious and violent crime stabilization or 
geographical approach332 and the organized-crime approach, both of which were supported by 
multi-disciplinary interventions.333 
Within the first few months of Operation Crackdown’s launch, over 600 stolen vehicles were 
recovered as well as arms and ammunition.  It was successful with regards to its mission 
concerning PAGAD and gangs as well as other crimes such as taxi and bus violence in the 
Western Cape.   However, PAGAD’s final demise came with the launch of Operation Lancer. 
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Operation Lancer334 was launched four days after 9/11.  Initially a provincial operation, it was 
later launched in South Africa as a whole.  The operation, based on intelligence-gathering and 
aimed at successful investigations and prosecutions in court, was launched as a precaution for 
possible terrorist attacks on US interests in the country.  Operation Lancer also reduced PAGAD 
related incidents to a minimum in 2001.335  Only nine PAGAD-related incidents occurred in that 
year and this was due to the fact that most of PAGAD’s important and prominent members were 
arrested and tried according the current security legislation. 
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
When examining the strategies used to respond to PAGAD, it becomes clear that a combination 
of tactics were deployed.  Using the criminal justice model, the strategies used were categorized 
as political strategies and intelligence-led policing operations.  They had different levels of 
effectiveness and mainly focused on pre acts-of-terrorism reduction and post act-of-terrorism 
recovery.  
 
In terms of responding to PAGAD, some strategies were effective.  For instance, the government 
made use of intelligence to obtain information on PAGAD and it employed political strategies 
that delegitimized PAGAD and isolated it from its supporters.  Moreover, by using the criminal 
justice model and the security legislation, crucial PAGAD members were arrested and 
prosecuted. 
Yet, the government also made several mistakes and failed to take into consideration certain 
strategies when responding to PAGAD.  The government did not recognize PAGAD as terrorist 
threat until it was too late.  The national government was confused about the situation at hand 
and had allowed politics to come into play thus resulting in under-reaction.   This under-reaction 
allowed PAGAD to thrive and diversify its tactics.   
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Likewise, the provincial government did not react decisively against PAGAD when it first 
emerged, thinking that the ANC was behind PAGAD. 
The government’s reluctance to perceive PAGAD as a terrorist threat creates the impression that 
the theory and literature of terrorism and responding to terrorism was not understood when the 
democratic government came into power.  In addition, as the South African government is bound 
to respect fundamental civil liberties and has to govern within distinct judicial and constitutional 
restraints, it found itself in a dilemma in terms of acting decisively and ruthlessly against 
PAGAD.  This, too, led to “under-reaction”.  If this “under-reaction” had not occurred, by 
devising effective strategies, the South African government would have been able to control and 
suppress PAGAD’s activities much sooner. 
 
Not only did the government initially under-react to PAGAD and then, to a certain degree, 
overreact by formulating the ATB, the intelligence-led policing operations that formed part of 
the government’s response to PAGAD were also relatively ineffective.  They would only create a 
sense of peace for several weeks because, soon after an operation was launched, PAGAD would 
continue to operate and engage in terrorism.  In fact, only Operation Lancer was said to have had 
an impact on PAGAD because, first, its main aim was to destroy PAGAD and not to “create an 
impression” and “instill confidence in the minds of the people”.336   
 
The government did develop a coherent and effective response to PAGAD by 1999 and 
Operation Lancer formed part of this effective response.  It is assumed that the government had 
more information, resources and experience in dealing with PAGAD by this time, especially in a 
democratic context.337 
 
However, it needs to be clarified that Operation Lancer was only successful to a certain degree.  
When it was launched, PAGAD’s important members were already incarcerated and the 
government had managed to deflate PAGAD’s appeal and delegitimize PAGAD.  As with the 
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previous operations, Operation Lancer was not necessarily the only contributors to PAGAD’s 
demise because PAGAD was the main cause for its own demise by 2001. 
 
Overall, when analyzing the strategies employed by the government to respond to PAGAD, one 
can observe that, initially, there was a lot of uncertainty, many mistakes were made and many 
important issues that were overlooked.  However, once the government was pressurized to act 
decisively against PAGAD, effective strategies were devised which contributed to PAGAD’s 
decline.  Yet, while these strategies were implemented within the context of the existing legal 
framework without adversely affecting the rights and freedoms of the citizens, these strategies 





































Formulating and executing strategies to respond to terrorism are particular challenges for 
constitutional democracies.  Not only should these strategies be efficient, they should also not be 
at the cost of human rights, the rule of law and the Constitution.  This is the challenge that South 
Africa faced with the emergence of PAGAD, an organization that engaged in domestic terrorism 
from 1996 to 2001.   
 
By using PAGAD as a case-study, this research paper analyzed the South African government’s 
response to PAGAD.  It examined the strategies used by the government and analyzed whether 
they conformed to the principles embodied in the Constitution and the rule of law.  This paper 
also identified some of the key issues that constitutional democracies face when responding to 
terrorism, it examined South Africa’s present security legislation and discussed how terrorism 
was dealt with during Apartheid and it discussed PAGAD’s evolution from the time it emerged 
in 1996 to its decline in 2001. 
 
In analyzing the response to terrorism by constitutional democracies, certain observations were 
made.  First, the “criminal justice model” and the “military model” are the best basic approaches.  
Both models have their strengths, yet, they also have their flaws.  Both models are short-term 
solutions concerning the problem of terrorism and they violate constitutional principles.   
 
Second, terrorism inherently invites an overreaction in constitutional democracies.  When 
overreactions occur, governments make extreme and unjustified departures from conventional 
judicial and law enforcement procedures.  Furthermore, overreactions threaten constitutional 
rights and liberties, they prohibit states from responding to terrorism in a proportional manner 
and, if not reversed, they cause more damage than the terrorists. 
 
Third, democracies are constrained when it comes to responding to terrorism and they provide a 
permissive environment for terrorism to occur.  Terrorists take advantage of such an environment 













move around unrestricted.  However, preventing or responding to terrorism is possible in 
constitutional democracies. There are various measures within the intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies which can be effectively utilized and the impact of these measures can be 
assessed by observing the terrorist organizations’ expansion.  At times, however, the 
government’s actions may have little to do with the decline of terrorist organizations because 
terrorist organizations can self-destruct.   
 
Finally, if the government does not respond appropriately to certain situations or they do not 
keep their promises, vigilante groups may emerge.   
 
This paper also looked at the evolution of the legislation used to respond to terrorism in South 
Africa.  During Apartheid, the police and the covert security agencies excelled in infiltration and 
other aspects of the criminal justice approach even though human rights abuses occurred.  Hence, 
the democratic government made several amendments to the security legislation to make it 
constitutional.  However, the present legislation has remnants of the Apartheid legislature, the 
NIA engages in domestic spying and the police still use coercive methods against suspects.   
 
Concerning PAGAD, by tracing the organization’s evolution from its emergence to its decline, 
this research paper showed that, when PAGAD first emerged in Cape Town, the government and 
the general community perceived it as a “vigilante” group as a result of its noble aims of striving 
to combat crime, drugs and gangsterism in the communities.  It was a loose organization founded 
initially by Qibla members.  However, once drug-dealers and gangsters became resistant (in a 
violent manner) to PAGAD’s non-violent tactics and once a “split” supposedly occurred within 
PAGAD in 1996, the organization’s tactics became more violent.  From 1996 until its dormancy 
in 2001, PAGAD used various methods including terrorism to achieve its objectives.   
As a result of the violent acts it was carrying out, PAGAD was perceived as a terrorist threat 
until its decline in 2001.  While it may seem that it was the government’s counter-strategies that 
caused the organization’s decline, it needs to be pointed out that PAGAD was, for the most part, 
the result of its own demise.  By arresting PAGAD’s important members, by creating division in 













was effective in weakening PAGAD.  However, PAGAD itself was a misguided organization 
that had many internal problems that contributed to its own decline.  For instance, the fact that 
PAGAD had attacked the MJC, a very influential organization amongst the Muslims in the 
Western Cape, led to a decline in its support.   
Additionally, the unstructured leadership of PAGAD, the obvious disunity amongst all its 
members concerning PAGAD’s use of violence and the undertaking of acts that constituted 
terrorism were also aspects that led to PAGAD’s loss of support and, eventually, its decline.   
Undoubtedly, not only did PAGAD’s emergence affirm the notion that the government’s failure 
to deliver on its promises can lead to the use of terrorism, but it also affirmed the notion that 
constitutional democracies are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In addition, constitutional 
democracies are constrained when responding to terrorism and they provide a permissive 
environment for terrorism to occur.   
 
PAGAD undoubtedly challenged the new democratic South African government.  This was the 
country’s first experience with terrorism within a democratic context.  Hence, once the ANC 
government had classified PAGAD as a terrorist threat, it did everything in its power to try to 
destroy and undermine it.  PAGAD posed a threat to the internal stability and security of South 
Africa and it undermined the fundamental principles of law and human rights.   
 
In this research paper, it was shown that the intelligence-led policing operations and political 
strategies used to counter PAGAD fell within the domain of the “criminal justice model” and 
mainly focused on pre acts-of-terrorism reduction and post act-of-terrorism recovery.  While the 
political strategies that were employed to counter PAGAD were mainly executed to delegitimize 
the organization and to hinder it from gaining support, the intelligence-led policing operations 
mainly involved the pursuance, the arrest and the prosecution of PAGAD members. 
 
While some of the counter-terrorist strategies used by the government were relatively ineffective 
in undermining PAGAD, some were effective.  For instance, as part of the pre acts-of-terrorism 
reduction phase, intelligence was used to draw out important information that proved useful in 













and, with the help of “informers” (as these were fellow PAGAD members, the government used 
this to create internal division within PAGAD), intelligence was able to obtain information about 
the acts of terrorism that PAGAD was planning to carry out and who was involved.   
Moreover, the political strategy to undermine PAGAD involved lessening the terrorists’ access 
to support, resources and information that would help them in terms of training, obtaining 
weapons and explosives and reaching safe houses; re-enforcing the pre-existing schism between 
PAGAD and the MJC in an attempt to delegitimize PAGAD; and hindered its ability to gain 
public and financial support.   
With regards to the ineffective counter-terrorist strategies used to undermine PAGAD, the 
government made several mistakes that constitutional democracies usually make when 
countering terrorism.  The South African government did not recognize PAGAD as terrorist 
threat until it was well into its campaign of violence.  While some terrorist groups do not reveal 
themselves prior to an attack, in democracies, the trend has been that the development of a 
terrorist campaign is usually preceded by a campaign of defamation and subversive propaganda 
against liberal values, institutions and leadership.  This particular trend that internal defence 
forces do not pick and act upon rapidly illustrates the fact that democracies usually incorrectly 
assess the situation that they are dealing with.  This is what occurred with PAGAD and the 
government.  Despite the fact that PAGAD had clear “anti-state” sentiments and the fact that 
Staggie’s murder was ascribed to PAGAD members, the government did not perceive PAGAD 
as a terrorist threat. 
The government also failed to internalize the problem and agree on common strategies that could 
have resolved the situation quickly.  This aspect, as well as not recognizing PAGAD as a terrorist 
threat early on, had many repercussions.  It resulted in under-reaction on behalf of the national 
government.  Both the national government and the provincial leaders did not react to PAGAD 
promptly and adequately, thus allowing PAGAD to diversify its goals and tactics, an aspect that 
proved to be more detrimental for the South African society.   
One of the reasons behind this under-reaction was that government was confused about the 













particular, the national government did not want to follow in the foot-steps of the Western 
countries (especially the US) in labelling PAGAD as an Islamic militant or fundamentalist 
terrorist organization. It did not want to be criticized as another racist regime. At the provincial 
level, the political parties were accusing each other of enabling PAGAD’s emergence. 
 
Another reason for the government’s under-reaction was that, when PAGAD emerged, 
democracy in South Africa was very fragile and the government was taking all possible measures 
to consolidate the new born democratic South Africa.  Additionally, with regards to the law 
enforcement agencies, while the financial resources, the equipment and the man-power were 
available, the training, the required skills and the necessary experience to deal with the situation 
were lacking. 
 
By the time the government finally admitted that PAGAD was a terrorist threat to the country; 
PAGAD had already caused much damage and problems to the province.  In the light of this 
situation, against all expectations, the response was incoherent and ineffective.  This was so 
because, similar to other democracies facing the same problem, the South African government 
found itself in a dilemma in terms of acting decisively and ruthlessly against PAGAD due to the 
fact that it was bound to respect fundamental civil liberties and had to govern within distinct 
judicial and constitutional restraints.  Instead of using appropriate, well thought and well planned 
effective strategies to counter PAGAD, the government reacted hastily and, to a certain degree, it 
overreacted.  As a result of this overreaction, a number of actions were planned like the devising 
of the ATB which, if executed, would have jeopardized the democratic principles of South 
Africa.   
 
Moreover, not only did the South Africa government overreact and attempt to implement a 
draconian ATB, it also condoned several unlawful arrests (mostly Muslims).  Such actions as 
well as the  deliberate discrediting of PAGAD by law enforcement individuals and the fact that 
certain government officials such as Steve Tshwete and the acting premier of the Western Cape, 
Peter Marais wanted certain laws amended played into PAGAD’s hands and played against the 
government and the law enforcement agencies.  PAGAD gained some legitimacy as their 













the law enforcement agencies lost some legitimacy due to the fact that they were resorting to 
illegal methods in order to try and counter PAGAD.   
On the other hand, by 1999, partly due to improved intelligence and improved law enforcement, 
the strategies to counter PAGAD were more effective and coherent.  Of course, PAGAD as an 
organization was already declining at that point. Yet, it is also important to mention that 
democratic values were not jeopardized and no civilian casualties were registered when the 
government countered PAGAD.  This is due to the fact that, unlike constitutional democracies 
that allow the military model to have the leading role when countering terror, in South Africa, 
the military had a limited role in countering PAGAD.      
Overall, when one analyzes the government’s response to PAGAD, there are several important 
issues that come to the fore.  First, in its response to PAGAD, the government illustrated some of 
the problems that constitutional democracies face when responding to terrorism.  For instance, 
the government was not able to recognize PAGAD as a terrorist threat early enough (thus, the 
terrorist acts were not prevented) and it under-reacted and then overreacted to the situation at 
hand.  Additionally, the counter-terrorist strategies that were used were ad-hoc and devised to 
deal exclusively with the “PAGAD phenomenon”.  This reveals that, similar to other 
constitutional democracies, South Africa was unable to grasp the fact that terrorism can be 
effectively combated within a democratic context and that the essential components that allow 
for effective counter-terrorism strategies to be applicable in different situations was absent.   
 
On the other hand, in certain respects, South Africa’s response to PAGAD deviated from what 
one perceives when constitutional democracies respond to terrorism.  The military had a limited 
role in countering PAGAD and it was illustrated that, even though preventing terrorism is 
challenging, there are mechanisms in place that counter them.    
 
On the whole, while South Africa’s response to PAGAD illustrates what one would expect from 
a constitutional democracy responding to terrorism, in certain respects, South Africa’s response 
also deviated from the expected norm.  The military had a limited role and it was illustrated that 
there were mechanisms in place that contained their role.  This reveals that, as a new 












its behaviour on what older democracies have done.  This is important as responding to terrorism 
needs a flexibility of approach, especially for countries, such as South Africa, which have had a 
turbulent past and a legacy of violence.  The risks of terrorism in such permissive environments 
are real. Accordingly, constitutional democracies need to deal with terrorism based on their 
capabilities and internal situation rather than traditional methods.  Hence the some of the 
expectations about responding to terrorism in constitutional democracies may not be appropriate 
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